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THE SUPREME COURT AND FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION FROM 1791 TO 1917
MICHAEL T. GIBSON*
INTRODUCTIONS ILENCE often is important: to Sherlock Holmes, for example, a
dog's failure to bark during the night was significant and suspicious. I
The failure of American courts and legal scholars to discuss more than a
century of the history of freedom of speech and freedom of the press is
also cause for suspicion. Scholars have analyzed freedom of expression
from colonial times to the battle over the Sedition Act of 1798,2 yet for
the period after the expiration of that statute in 180 1,3 there is little but
silence. Except for a few studies of isolated incidents concerning the first
amendment,4 scholars jump from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the Espio-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University. B.A. 1979, University of
Nebraska-Lincoln; J.D. 1982, Yale University; Law Clerk to Chief Judge Warren K.
Urbom, U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska, 1982-84. The Author would
like to thank Professor Owen Fiss of the Yale Law School for reviewing two early drafts
of this paper. The Author also is grateful to Professors Phillip Kurland and Ralph Ler-
ner of the University of Chicago for their comments regarding freedom of speech and the
press in the eighteenth century and for making available page proofs of The Founders'
Constitution (1987).
1. A. Doyle, Silver Blaze, in The Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes (1894) (investigating
the disappearance of a race horse, Holmes deduces from the watchdog's failure to bark
that the horse was taken by his trainer with whom the dog was familiar).
2. The Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). See, eg., 5 The Founders' Constitu-
tion 112-85 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987); Freedom Of The Press From Zenger To
Jefferson (L. Levy ed. 1966); L. Levy, Emergence Of A Free Press (1985) [hereinafter
Levy II]; L. Levy, Legacy Of Supression (1960) [hereinafter Levy I]; J. Miller, Crisis In
Freedom (1951); J. Smith, Freedom's Fetters (1956); Berns, Freedom of the Press and the
Alien and Sedition Laws: A Reappraisal, 1970 Sup. Ct. Rev. 109; Farber, Reflections on
the Sedition Act of 1798, 62 A.B.A. J. 324 (1976); Hamburger, The Development of the
Law of Seditious Libel and the Control of the Press, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 661 (1985); Kahane,
Colonial Origins of Our Free Press, 62 A.B.A. J. 202 (1976); Kurland, The Original Un-
derstanding of the Freedom of the Press Provision of the First Amendment, 55 Miss. LJ.
225 (1985); Levy, The Legacy Reexamined, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 767 (1985); Rabban, The
Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History
(Book Review), 37 Stan. L. Rev. 795 (1985).
3. The act expired by its own terms on March 3, 1801. The Sedition Act, ch. 74,
§ 4, 1 Stat. 596, 597 (1798).
4. Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the Warren Court (H. Nelson ed. 1967)
(selection of historical documents discussing freedom of the press); Anderson, The Form-
ative Period of First Amendment Theory, 1870-1915, 24 Am. J. Legal Hist. 56 (1980)
(municipal ordinances and academic debate affecting first amendment rights); Martin,
Freedom of Speech in North Carolina Prior to Gitlow v. New York, 4 Camp. L. Rev. 243
(1982); McCullough, The History of the First Amendment and the Acts of September 24.
1789, and March 2, 1831, 12 S.D.L. Rev. 171 (1967) (survey of questionable media cover-
age of legal profession and judicial proceedings); Roper, James Kent and the Emergence
of New York's Libel Law, 17 Am. J. Legal Hist. 223 (1973) (examining law of libel as a
deterrent to freedom of the press after expiration of Sedition Act of 1798); Tarrant, To
"insure domestic Tranquility" Congress and the Law of Seditious Conspiracy 1859-1861,
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nage Act of 19171 and Justice Holmes's "clear and present danger"
opinions of 1919,6 paying little, if any, attention to the intervening pe-
riod.7 The silence of a watchdog during a single night is puzzling; a one
hundred and twenty year gap in the history of one of the most important
parts of the Constitution is quite disturbing. It would be troubling if, for
over a century, litigants and judges neither invoked nor discussed free-
dom of speech and of the press; and it would also be cause for concern if
courts had discussed those freedoms but had interpreted them in a man-
ner inconsistent with modern interpretations of the first amendment.
These concerns bode ill for the traditional American view that this
nation always has valued and zealously protected the right to free expres-
sion.s Discussions of the amendment's formation and its relation to the
Sedition Act have suggested that the original meaning of the first amend-
15 Am. J. Legal Hist. 107 (1971) (examining attempt to pass a law of seditious conspiracy
in immediate pre-Civil War period).
5. Espionage Act, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917), as amended by Act of May 16, 1918,
ch. 75, § 1, 40 Stat. 553 (1918) (repealed 1948).
6. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Debs v.
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
7. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 Yale L.J. 514, 516-17
(1981) (scholars and judges accepted Professor Chafee's interpretation of the history of
free speech cases that "essentially ignored the years between the Sedition Act of 1798 and
the Espionage Act of 1917"); see also Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court. Full
Faith and the Bill of Rights, 1889-1910, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 870 (1985) ("Study of this
area tends to begin with the great espionage cases of the First World War."); see, e.g., E.
Barrett & W. Cohen, Constitutional Law 1050-53 (7th ed. 1984); N. Dorsen, P. Bender,
& B. Neuborne, Political and Civil Rights in the United States 17.-31 (4th ed. 1976) (brief
discussion of first amendment events during nineteenth century); D. Gillmor & J. Barron,
Mass Communication Law 96 (1974) (Supreme Court gave no serious attention to first
amendment until World War I); G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 972-76 (11 th ed. 1985)
(Court's first major free speech cases came after World War I); W. Lockhart, Y.
Kamisar, & J. Choper, The American Constitution 650 (5th ed. 1980) (no discussion); R.
Rotunda, Modern Constitutional Law Cases And Notes (1985) (no discussion).
Even contemporary scholars devoted relatively little space to freedom of expression.
See, e.g., 2 Kent's Commentaries On American Law 16-26, 35-37 (0. Holmes Jr. 12th ed.
1884) (eleven pages discussing libel and four discussing religion in a four-volume work); 2
Story's Commentaries On The Constitution Of The United States 613-47 (5th ed. 1891)
(thirty-five pages discussing first amendment in two-volume work); Yale Law School
Faculty. Two Centuries' Growth Of American Law (1980) (no mention of first amend-
ment); J. Thayer, Cases On Constitutional Law 732, 869 (1895) (discussion limited to
regulation of parades and the mails). The first authoritative history of the Suprenie Court
makes frequent, though brief, references to the Sedition Act, see 1 C. Warren. The
Supreme Court in United States History 164-65, 180, 191, 215, 225-26, 267, 273, 282,
358, 363-65 (rev. ed. 1932); and discusses United States v. Hudson, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 32
(1812). see 1 C. Warren, gupra, at 437-39; Civil War censorship, see 2 C. Warren, supra,
at 373 & n. 1; Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882), see 2 C. Warren, supra, at 651-52; and
Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913), see 2 C. Warren, supra, at 723.
8. Professor Levy, for example, acknowledged the dangers that historical research
presented to what he called the "Holmes-Chafee traditional liberal position," after Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Harvard Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr. See Levy II, supra
note 2, at viii-ix.
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ment was far narrower than its current meaning,' and one might expect
that nineteenth and early twentieth century judicial interpretations of the
first amendment would reflect or confirm that narrow, original meaning.
Recently, it has been argued that the Supreme Court's decisions from
that period constituted "an established pattern of hostility to First
Amendment concerns."' Indeed, several cases would seem to support
those who would use stare decisis or framers' intent to constrict modern
first amendment law." Furthermore, neither Justice Holmes nor
Harvard Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., who influenced Holmes,' 2
cited any cases to support their new clear and present danger doctrine,"
9. Levy I, supra note 2; Levy II, supra note 2; Kurland, supra note 2, at 23248
10. Rabban, supra note 7, at 524-25.
11. A number of judges have advocated the use of the framers' intent to interpret the
Constitution. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-106, 113-14 (1985) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (framers' intent indicates that prayer in elementary public schools does not
violate first amendment); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787-93 (1983) (Burger, CJ.)
(Congress' 200 year old practice of opening its sessions with prayer authorizes hiring of
Presbyterian chaplain by state legislature); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 778 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (fourteenth amendment cannot be read apart from the "origi-
nal understanding at Philadelphia"); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54
Tex. L. Rev. 693, 695 (1976) (impermissible to substitute "some other set of values for
those which may be derived from the language and intent of the framers"). Some legal
scholars have seriously questioned the value of the framers' intent in constitutional inter-
pretation. See, e.g., Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Har'. L.
Rev. 885 (1985); Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1033 (1981).
12. See Rabban, supra note 7, at 586-94 (discussing Chafee's approach and its influ-
ence on the dissents by Justices Holmes and Brandeis in first amendment cases); Ragan,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee Jr., and The Clear and Present
Danger Test for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919, 58 J. Am. Hist. 24 (197 1) (attmbutng
Justice Holmes's later, more liberal free speech opinions to the influence of Chafee). But
see Bogen, The Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 Hofstra L. Rev . 97,
98-99 (1982) (arguing that the perceived change in Justice Holmes's view of free speech
was due to a misreading of his earlier opinions rather than Chafee's influence); Ginsburg,
Afterward to Ernst Freund and the First Amendment Tradition, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 243
(1973) (discussing possible influence of Judge Learned Hand on Justice Holmes); Gun-
ther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Frag-
ments of History, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 719 (1975) (discussing correspondence between Judge
Learned Hand and Justice Holmes); Kalven, Professor Ernst Freund and Debs v United
States, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 235 (1973) (discussing Professor Freund's criticism of
Holmes's opinion in Debs).
13. Justice Holmes made very little use of precedent dealing with freedom of expres-
sion in his Espionage Act opinions. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S, 616, 627
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citing Schenck, Frohiwerk, and Debs); Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211, 213, 215 (1919) (citing Schenck, Frohwerk, and Ruthenberg V.
United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918)); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S 204, 206, 207,
210 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citing Schenck and Robertson %. Baldwin, 165 U S
275 (1897)); Schenck v. United States. 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919) (citing Patterson v.
Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418
(1911), and Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918)).
Chafee's first article on freedom of speech also paid little attention to federal case la'
before World War I. See Chafee, Freedon of Speech in War Time, 32 Hanw L. Rev, 932
(1919). His later work paid even less attention to pre-World War I precedent. See Z.
Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 16-30 (1941) (citing Gompers v. United States,
233 U.S. 604 (1914), one colonial case, and three state court decisions, but giving some
attention to eighteenth century freedom of expression); Chafee, Thirty-Five Years iith
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suggesting that either no case law existed on the subject or that stare
decisis was more of a hindrance than a help. Chafee dismissed the value
of all precedent in a one sentence, unsupported assertion that earlier
cases were too few and varied to be of value, 4 suggesting that he might
have been slipping a muzzle on a somewhat uncooperative dog. Of
course, one should also ask if there was a dog to muzzle: it might be very
revealing if for one hundred and twenty years the courts had overlooked
or ignored the amendment.
This Article attempts to address these concerns by examining the
Supreme Court's treatment of freedom of speech and the press from the
adoption of the first amendment in 1791 to the enactment of the Espio-
nage Act in 1917. The Court issued opinions in over sixty cases that
today we would consider as concerning the first amendment."5 Part I
Freedom of Speech, 1 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1952) (all authoritative judicial interpretation
of first amendment occurred after 1917).
14. Z. Chafee, supra note 13, at 16 ("The pre-war cases were too few, too varied in
their character, and often too easily solved to develop any definite boundary between
lawful and unlawful speech.").
15. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) (labor); Marshall v.
Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917) (legislative criticism); Badders v. United States, 240 U.S.
391 (1916) (mail); Weber v. Freed, 239 U.S. 325 (1915) (movies); Fox v. Washington, 236
U.S. 273 (1915) (advocacy); Mutual Film Corp. v. Hodges, 236 U.S. 248 (1915) (movies);
Mutual Film Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 247 (1915) (movies); Mutual Film
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915) (movies); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S.
1 (1915) (labor); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914) (libel); Gompers v. United
States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914) (labor); Baker v. Warner, 231 U.S. 588 (1913) (libel); Nalle v.
Oyster, 230 U.S. 165 (1913) (libel); Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913)
(mail); Lewis Publishing Co. v. Wyman, 228 U.S. 610 (1913) (mail); Bartell v. United
States, 227 U.S. 427 (1913) (obscenity); Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U.S. 53 (1912) (mail);
Pickford v. Talbott, 225 U.S. 651 (1912) (libel); Gandia v. Pettingill, 222 U.S. 452 (1912)
(libel); Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York City, 221 U.S. 467 (1911) (advertising);
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911) (labor); United States v. Press
Publishing Co., 219 U.S. 1 (1911) (seditious libel); Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185
(1909) (privacy); Pickford v. Talbott, 211 U.S. 199 (1908) (libel); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208
U.S. 274 (1908) (labor); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (labor); Houghton v.
Meyer, 208 U.S. 149 (1908) (mail); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907) (court
criticism); Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907) (advertising); Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S. 138 (1904) (libel); Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904) (mail);
Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904) (free speech and aliens); Bates & Guild Co. v.
Payne, 194 U.S. 106 (1904) (mail); Smith v. Payne, 194 U.S. 104 (1904) (mail); Houghton
v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88 (1904) (mail); American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAn-
nulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902) (mail); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co., 181 U.S.
92 (1901) (telegraph rates); Abbott v. Tacoma Bank of Commerce, 175 U.S. 409 (1899)
(libel); Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897) (speech in public parks); Dunlop v.
United States, 165 U.S. 486 (1897) (obscenity); Price v. United States, 165 U.S. 311
(1897) (obscenity); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897) (original intent of the
Constitution); Andrews v. United States, 162 U.S. 420 (1896) (obscenity); Swearingen v.
United States, 161 U.S. 446 (1896) (obscenity); Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29
(1896) (obscenity); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (labor strike); Grimm v. United
States, 156 U.S. 604 (1895) (obscene); Homer v. United States, 143 U.S. 207 (1892) (mail
advertising for lottery); In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892) (mail use for lottery); Holden v.
Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483 (1890) (exclusion of reporters from witnessing execution);
United v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255 (1890) (obscenity); Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 (1884)
(libel); Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882) (government employees); Ex parte Jackson,
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will suggest some caveats to the use of these cases in evaluating freedom
of speech. Part II will analyze cases dealing with criticism of govern-
ment, showing that the Court had been indecisive, never endorsing but
never firmly rejecting the doctrine of seditious libel. In addition, one of
the Court's most important decisions in this area was shaped by contem-
porary pressures and the personal emotions of the justices, not the first
amendment.16 In Part III, cases involving government control over
methods of communication will be discussed. It will be shown that con-
temporary pressures and personal emotions also played an important role
in these decisions. Hampered by these factors and the lack of a first
amendment specialist, the Court's opinions often were illogical or incon-
sistent. Part IV argues that the failure of Justice Holmes and Professor
Chafee to consider earlier first amendment decisions was justified by the
unresolved inconsistency of those precedents with the language and
framers' intent of the first amendment. It will be demonstrated that the
Court paid only lip service to the intent of the framers and in one crucial
case reached an opinion that was flatly inconsistent with the intent of the
drafters. '
On the whole, the Court's early decisions present no threat to the mod-
em interpretation of the first amendment developed by Holmes and
Chafee. Instead, the early decisions are examples of how the Constitu-
tion's guarantees of free speech and a free press should not be inter-
preted. They deservedly have been left dormant.
I. THE LIMITATIONS OF EARLY SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The Supreme Court's early decisions are the best source of information
for the meaning of freedom of expression in the United States before
World War I. They are authoritative; they are readily available to schol-
ars; and while they cover many aspects of freedom of expression, they are
few enough in number to be analyzed in a single article. Still, they pres-
ent an incomplete and somewhat misleading picture for three reasons.
First, many disputes involving freedom of expression never reached
the Court. The first amendment was not held to apply to the states until
1925, when the Court "incorporated" it into the due process clause of the
96 U.S. 727 (1877) (mail); Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225 (1875) (libel); United States v.
Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1868) (mail); Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284 (1851)
(mail); United States v. Bromley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 88 (1851) (mail); White v. Nicholls,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845) (libel); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821)
(legislative criticism); United States v. Hudson, I1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (seditious
libel).
16. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), discussed infra at notes 134-69
and accompanying text.
17. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915), discussed
infra at notes 442-68 and accompanying text.
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fourteenth amendment."s Nineteenth century procedural 9 and substan-
tive2" rules also prevented the Court from considering many cases from
the lower federal courts and nearly all of the thousands of state court
cases. In addition, extrajudicial factors such as threats of violence,2
18. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). During the debates on the Bill of
Rights, the House of Representatives approved a provision that said that "[n]o State shall
violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in
criminal cases." I Annals of Congress 755 (J. Gales ed. 1834). The Senate, however,
rejected the proposal. 2 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 1146
(1971).
The Court seldom interpreted state laws. See, e.g., Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 241-45 (1915) (decision construing free speech provision of the
Ohio Constitution); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907) (dicta analyzing the effect
of the first amendment on contempt order issued under state law by state court). How-
ever, digests, treatises and court opinions refer to hundreds of state cases involving free-
dom of expression. See, e.g., Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530, 541-42 (6th Cir.
1893) (Taft, J.); 32 Am. Dig. 1850-2494 (Century ed. 1902); 2 Kent's Commentaries,
supra note 7, at 16-26. State decisions varied widely in protection afforded speech. Com-
pare Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908) (broad protection given to
commentary about public officials) with Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.)
304 (1826) (truth is not a defense in criminal libel action); compare also State ex rel.
Attorney General v. Circuit Court, 97 Wisc. 1, 72 N.W. 193 (1897) (overturning trial
court judge's order of contempt against newspaper editor who had opposed judge's cam-
paign for reelection) with In re Chadwick, 109 Mich. 588, 67 N.W. 1071 (1896) (affirming
contempt order by trial judge for criticism of him made outside the courtroom).
19. The limitations on Supreme Court review of lower court decisions were the great-
est barrier to consideration. See The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73,
84-85; see also infra notes 48-51. General federal question jurisdiction was not provided
until 1875. See Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. Moreover, during the
1890's the Supreme Court suffered severe backlogs, and the average time from docketing
to decision was four years. 12 J. Moore, H. Bendix & B. Ringle, Moore's Federal Prac-
tice 300.02[5], at 1-35 (2d ed. 1982).
20. For example, declaratory judgments were not available. Therefore, a statute
could be contested only if someone could be found who was willing to violate the law and
suffer arrest. See 6A J. Moore, supra note 19, 57.0211]. The federal Declaratory Judg-
ment Act was not adopted until 1934. See ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1982)); see also Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 112-13
(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (legislative history of De-
claratory Judgment Act indicates that Congress sought to avoid forcing parties to violate
a statute in order to secure an adjudication of their rights). The absence of declaratory
relief also meant that there were more physical confrontations between protestors and
police, provoking violence that reduced the willingness of courts to sympathize with the
protestors.
States and cities tended to regulate free speech through criminal charges of nuisance or
breach of peace. See P. Murphy, The Meaning of Freedom of Speech 17 (1972); Ander-
son, supra note 4, at 65-66. The Supreme Court had only limited power to review these
cases because habeas corpus was severely restricted. See W. Duker, A Constitutional
History of Habeas Corpus 182-204 (1980); see also R. Sokol, Federal Habeas Corpus 17-
18 (2d ed. 1969) (prior to 1867 habeas corpus only available for prisoners in federal cus-
tody and no appeal from denial of writ).
21. During one week in 1835, a contemporary writer found five hundred stories about
mob violence in U.S. newspapers. R. Nye, Fettered Freedom 176-77 (1963); see also In re
Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 566-73 (1895) (discussing violence related to labor movement); J.
Daniels, They Will Be Heard 157-62 (1965) (in 1863, the New York Times sent two
breech-loading machine guns and sixteen riflemen to protect Horace Greeley's Herald
Tribune from a mob); E. Emery & M. Emery, The Press and America 174 (5th ed. 1984)
[Vol. 55
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economic and social pressures, 22 and limited financial resources2 3 may
(abolitionist editor killed by pro-slavery mob); L. Goodwyn, The Populist Movement
190, 193-95 (1978) (violence against Populist party).
22. For example, in 1896 many employers allegedly told their workers not to report
for work if William Jennings Bryan was elected president. J. Hicks, The Populist Revolt
375 (1961). Social pressures, augmented in many cases by physical violence and eco-
nomic forces, also severely infringed the free expression rights of black Americans, see C.
Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (2d ed. 1966), but little mention of those
pressures appear in published court decisions. Several early cases held that neither slave
nor free blacks were entitled to any civil, social, or political rights, see, e.g., Bryan v.
Watson, 20 Ga. 480 (1856); Heirn v. Bridault, 37 Miss. 208 (1859), but an extensive
examination of contemporary digests and scholarly works has revealed only two pub-
lished decisions involving the first amendment rights of blacks. See United States v. Mall,
26 F. Cas. 1147 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,712) (one paragraph report of decision
holding that a federal statute protected the free speech rights of blacks and was constitu-
tional); African Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of New Orleans, 15 La. Ann. 441
(1860) (upholding city ordinance barring blacks from assembling for worship without
white supervision); see also H. Kalven, The Negro and the First Amendment (1965)
(mentioning only three cases during this period, none directly involving blacks and the
first amendment). There were at least thirty regularly published black newspapers in the
nation by 1891, I. Penn, The Afro-American Press 112-13 (1981), which suggests that
opportunity for cases involving the first amendment rights of blacks certainly existed.
The suppression of the rights of women to speak and publish is more difficult to assess.
A multi-volume work by three advocates of women's rights does not mention a single
lawsuit involving the free speech of women. See E. Stanton, S.B. Anthony, & M. Gage,
History Of Woman Suffrage (1881) [hereinafter E. Stanton]. The digests, while full of
cases concerning the rights of women to vote and hold public office, do not mention any
cases involving women and the first amendment. Women were excluded as delegates
from an international anti-slavery conference held in London in 1840, see T. Smith, The
American Philosophy of Equality 95 (1927), and soon thereafter the Methodist and Con-
gregationalist Churches reversed their earlier policy of allowing women to serve as
preachers. Id at 96. Moreover, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision by the Illinois
Supreme Court to deny women admission to the bar. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130 (1872). But see E. Emery & M. Emery, supra note 19, at 160-61, 265-66
(discussion of female reporters during nineteenth century); 2 E. Stanton, supra, at 340-41
(Susan B. Anthony as delegate to 1868 Democratic National Convention): 2-3 E. Stan-
ton, supra, (detailing lobbying efforts for woman suffrage).
Moreover, the unwillingness or inability of executive officials to follow legislative and
judicial directives may have discouraged reliance on the courts. See A. Millett & P. Mas-
lowski, For The Common Defense 241-47 (1984) (describing the inability of U.S. army to
protect civil rights in Reconstruction South); see also Schroeder, The Historical Interpre-
tation of "Freedom of Speech and of the Press," 70 Cent. L. J. 223, 224 (March 25, 1910)
(describing Postal Department's refusal before World War I to transmit material that
Congress and the courts had said was mailable).
Finally, the population was substantially lower, resulting in fewer cases.
23. Corporations were the appellants in nearly all of the mail, motion picture, and
commercial speech cases decided by the Supreme Court. Appellants in the obscenity
cases were presumably motivated by the financial benefits of selling sexually explicit ma-
terial. Wealthy individuals who financed important free speech litigation included Joseph
Pulitzer, owner of the New York World and namesake of the Pulitzer Prize, who led the
fight in United States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U.S. 1 (1910), and Thomas Patterson,
a United States Senator and owner of one of Colorado's two largest newspapers, who was
the defendant in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). The labor cases could not
have been possible without the financial support of labor unions. Political organization by
socialists and anarchists enabled members of those groups to present Spies v. Illinois, 123
U.S. 131 (1887) and Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904) to the Supreme Court.
Similarly, proponents of religious rights under the first amendment were primarily those
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have discouraged many people from appearing in any court-let alone
the Supreme Court-to protect their rights. Thus, even during its most
prolific period between 1890 and 1917 the Court issued only a few free-
dom of expression opinions a year.24
The limited number of Supreme Court cases also affected the doctrine
the Court developed. Not only was the Court unable to address many
important areas, it also never developed a first amendment specialist.
During the Warren Court era, Justices Frankfurter, Black, and Brennan
regularly grappled with problems of speech and the press. Between 1791
and 1917, however, only Justice Holmes wrote as many as seven opinions
on first amendment issues, and most justices wrote only three or four
opinions on that subject during their entire tenures on the bench.25 Lack
of regular attention, and the absence of a specialist on the Court who
would ponder the intricacies of the amendment and the long-range effects
of the Court's decisions, stunted the amendment's growth.26 This is re-
flected in a number of cases where the Court ignored or misread its ear-
lier decisions or used superficial analysis.27
Secondly, the Court's decisions present an incomplete picture of free-
dom of expression during this time because they do not reveal popular
with access to financial support. For example, one case concerned the religious aspects of
a will involving millions of dollars, Vidal v. Girard's Executor, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127
(1844); and four cases concerned the ownership of public lands assigned to churches for
charitable purposes and were brought by parties seeking to gain the property, Terret v.
Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815); Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 291 (1815);
Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 565 (1829); and Society for the Propogation of the
Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Pawlett, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 480 (1830). One case concerned the
disposition of assets owned by the Methodist Church, see Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S.
(16 How.) 288 (1853); another involved government attack on the burial practices of the
Roman Catholic Church of New Orleans, see Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
589 (1845); and four involved merchants' attacks on laws requiring businesses to close on
Sunday. See Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164 (1900); Powliatan Steamboat Co. v. Appo-
mattox R.R., 65 U.S. (24 How.) 247 (1860); Richardson v. Goddard, 64 U.S. (23 How.)
28 (1859); Philadelphia, W. & B. R.R. v. Philadelphia Harre de Grace Steam Towboat
Co. 64 U.S. (23 How.) 539 (1845). A number of religion cases involved attacks on the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, which had considerable property and finan-
cial resources, or on its members, whom the Church supported. See, e.g., Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890). Very few religious cases did not involve dis-
putes over property rights or litigants with considerable financial support.
24. From 1791 to 1889, the Court heard twelve cases involving speech and press is-
sues, or one every eight years. Between 1890 and 1917, the Court heard 53 cases, or an
average of two every year. See supra note 15.
25. See supra note 15. Even the presence of several cases on a given issue in a few
years did not produce a specialist. The Court's six obscenity decisions between 1895 and
1897 had five different authors; the nine mail decisions between 1901 and 1916 had six
authors (Justice Brown wrote three opinions and Justice Holmes wrote two). Id.
26. Cf Cox, Federalism and Individual Rights Under the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 1, 13 (1978) (arguing that state court judges would develop more liberal and enthu-
siastic attitudes toward civil rights if more lawsuits claiming under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
were filed in state courts).
27. See, e.g., Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), discussed infra at notes 148-
51 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 55
1986] FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION FROM 1791 TO 1917 271
perceptions. Even a brief examination of contemporary newspapers
reveals that editors were only slightly restrained by the Court's doctrines.
The editorial treatment of President Lincoln,28 the exposures of the
Credit Mobilier scandal29 and Tammany Hall,30 and the development of
the muckraker3" are quite inconsistent with the idea that the press felt
shackled by the Court's interpretation of the first amendment.
The third limitation upon the value of the early Court decisions is the
most important: the federal government simply did not regulate speech
or the press for much of the nineteenth century and therefore the Court
did not address the amendment. Except for the Sedition Act, which ex-
pired in 1801,32 the Postmaster General's acquiescence in Southern cen-
sorship of abolitionist mail,33 and censorship of correspondents during
the Civil War,34 the federal government did little to provoke litigation
over first amendment rights to freedom of speech and the press until after
the Civil War.3 It was not until the 1870's that Congress enacted stat-
utes regulating obscenity,36 the use of the mails, 37 immigration of aliens
with unpopular beliefs,38 and the Mormon Church. 9 Thus, not until
the 1870's did Supreme Court decisions on freedom of expression become
more frequent. The relative silence of the Court regarding freedom of
expression during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century re-
28. For example, Northern newspapers during the Civil War described Abraham Lin-
coln as a "half-witted usurper," and "the head ghoul at Washington," see J. Tebbel, The
Compact History of the American Newspaper 117 (1963), and accused him of war-time
profiteering, making crucial decisions while intoxicated, and outright treason. See E_ Em-
ery & M. Emery, supra note 21, at 194.
29. See E. Emery & M. Emery, supra note 21, at 215-16 (Credit Mobilier and other
newspaper revelations of scandals in the Grant administration).
30. See A. Paine, Thomas Nast, His Period And Pictures 135-205 (1904) (newspaper
campaign against Tammany Hall of New York).
31. See The Muckrakers (A. Weinberg & L. Weinberg ed. 1961) (collection of most
important articles by leading muckrakers); L. Steffens, The Autobiography Of Lincoln
Steffens 357-84, 392-435 (1931) (describing the muckraking campaigns by McClure's
Magazine during late nineteenth and early twentieth century). See generalty L. Hand,
The Spirit Of Liberty 189-90 (3d. ed. 1960) (protection of liberty lies in "the hearts of
men and women" rather than constitutions, laws and courts).
32. The Sedition Act, ch. 74, § 4, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
33. See infra notes 203-05.
34. See E. Emery & M. Emery, supra note 21, at 238-45; see also H. Nelson, supra
note 4, at 232-47 (series of letters between Edwin M. Stanton and Abraham Lincoln
concerning closing a New York City newspaper for printing false stories about the Civil
War). Another scholar points out that Stanton and Secretary of State William H. Seward
had several Copperhead editors imprisoned, see J. Tebbel, supra note 28, at 119, but
asserts that, generally, Civil War field correspondents enjoyed more freedom than do
modern war correspondents. Id. at 116.
35. See L. Beth, The Development of the American Constitution 209 (1971). See
generally, H. Hyman & W. Wiecek, Equal Justice Under Law 237 (1972) (few govern-
ment restrictions on whites before the Civil War).
36. See infra notes 281-85.
37. See infra notes 206-84, 288-325 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 350-58 and accompanying text.
39. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 136 U.S. 1
(1890); Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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flects that the federal government was not attempting to limit the rights
of its citizens. Whatever hostility the Court may have displayed toward
freedom of expression after 1875 must be balanced against the federal
government's lack of hostile action for the preceding seventy-five years.
Despite these limitations, the decisions of the Supreme Court provide
valuable insight into the meaning of freedom of speech and the press
before World War I. Although they do not present a complete picture,
these decisions represented the precedent that Justice Holmes, Professor
Chafee, and other scholars and judges had to confront after World War I
in developing what we regard as modern first amendment doctrine.
II. CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT
Modern writers find the concept of seditious libel to be flatly incom-
patible with the existence of a republican form of government in which
the people are sovereign,4" let alone with the existence of the first
amendment. It seems self-evident that the electoral process can have
meaning only if voters can engage in frank and vigorous discussion about
the merits of the candidates, including criticism of incumbent govern-
ment officials. If the people, not government officials, are sovereign, it
should follow that those officials have no right to silence their critics.
The unconstitutionality of a modern equivalent to the Sedition Act of
1798 seems clear.4 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not expressly
condemn the concept of seditious libel until 1964, one hundred and sev-
enty years after the adoption of the first amendment, and then only in
dictum.42 The Court's failure to condemn prosecution of seditious libel
or to fully legitimize attacks on government and on government officials
during the period from 1791 to 1917, however, should not be read as a
tacit endorsement of the idea that citizens could be punished for criticiz-
ing the government.43 For various reasons, the Court never was able to
confront the issue directly, and, in cases in which it indirectly considered
the issue, its reactions were mixed.
40. See, e.g., Z. Chafee, supra note 13, at 18-19, 22, 31; Levy II, supra note 2, at xii;
Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amend-
ment," 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191, 205; see also J. Madison, Report On The Virginia Resolu-
tions (1800), reprinted in 5 The Founders Constitution, supra note 2, at 142-43, 145-47
(sovereignty of the people and elective nature of government requires freedom of the
press).
41. See Kurland, supra note 2, at 246.
42. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (restraint on criticism
of government and public officials imposed by the Sedition Act inconsistent with first
amendment). Individual justices also had attacked the Act. See, e.g., Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting): Beauharnais v. Illinois. 343 U.S.
250, 272 (1952) (Black J., dissenting); id. at 288-90 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
43. Seditious libel never has been clearly defined. Levy II, supra note 2, at 8. The
inclusion of a section on contempt of court under this topic suggests a slightly broader
meaning than usual, but is consistent with Levy's discussion of several contempt cases.
See id., at 206-11 (discussing Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (I DalI.) 319 (Pa. 1788)).
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A. The Sedition Act
One of the anomalies of first amendment history is that the Supreme
Court never addressed the constitutionality of the Sedition Act while the
Act was in force. The Act made it illegal to conspire with the intent "to
oppose any measure or measures of the government of the United States"
or "to intimidate or prevent" any federal official from performing his
duties.' The Act imposed criminal penalties on anyone who published
false, scandalous, and malicious writing against the federal government,
Congress, or the President with the intent to defame them, and the Act
made it illegal to excite against those entities "the hatred of the good
people of the United States," or to "excite any unlawful combinations
therein, for opposing or resisting any law of the United States, or any act
of the President."45 The Sedition Act was largely a partisan statute
drafted to protect incumbent members of the Federalist party from criti-
cism.46 Indeed, the Act was to expire on the last day of the term of office
of President John Adams, a Federalist.47
At least fourteen persons were prosecuted under the Act,4" yet the
Supreme Court remained silent as to the constitutionality of those prose-
cutions for the legitimate reason that it lacked jurisdiction. Under the
Judiciary Act of 1789, only the federal circuit courts had jurisdiction in
criminal matters.49 Nor did the Court's habeas corpus powers enable it
to consider the constitutionality of a statute under which a person had
been convicted. ° The lack of appellate criminal jurisdiction is particu-
larly strange because most of the first amendment issues of the time-as
well as matters involving the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments-would
have been raised by criminal defendants.5
44. Ch. 74, § 1, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
45. Id. at § 2.
46. See Levy II, supra note 2, at 297-300; cf J. Miller, supra note 2, at 136 ("The
Federal judges defined patriotism by their own narrow partisan standards and interpreted
seditious libel in such a way as to preclude ordinary political activity."). For example,
one defendant was convicted under the Sedition Act for saying that President Adams
"thirst[ed] for ridiculous pomp." Lyon's Case, 15 F. Cas. 1183, 1183 (C.C.D. Vt. 1798)
(No. 8,646).
47. Ch. 74, § 4, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
48. See Levy II, supra note 2, at 297-300; J. Miller, supra note 2. at 136.
49. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73. 76-79. Section 13 of the Act
gave the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction "in the cases herein after specially pro-
vided for," but § 22, which lists those cases, does not mention criminal prosecutions. I
Stat. at 81, 84-85. On the other hand, Justice Chase said at one circuit court trial, "if I
am not right, it is an error in judgment, and you can state the proceedings on the record
so as to show any error, and I shall be the first man to grant you the benefit of a new trial
by granting you a writ of error in the supreme court." United States v. Callender, 25 F
Cas. 239, 251 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709).
50. See Exparte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201-03 (1829) (section 14 of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789 only permits Court to inquire whether a court of competent jurisdiction
convicted the defendant, and not as to the grounds for conviction).
51. Most federal cases involving the first amendment's speech and press clauses were
statutory and common law prosecutions for seditious libel, and ordinary common laws
criminal libel actions. There was little or no federal activity in areas that today would
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Although the Court as a whole did not discuss the Sedition Act, indi-
vidual members of the Court did. All six justices during the 1798 and
1799 terms were members of the Federalist party, and four of them en-
dorsed the Act while trying cases in the circuit courts.5 2 Justice Chase's
conduct was the most blatantly partisan: he campaigned for the Act's
passage, 53 actively sought to enforce it,54 engaged in improper conduct
prompt civil lawsuits against the federal government. See Hyman, supra note 35, at 300-
01.
Conceivably, Congress believed that juries, not judges, would be the major source of
protection for unjustly persecuted defendants. A number of contemporary politicians
and drafters stressed the role of juries in protecting individuals from government oppres-
sion. See, e.g., Letter from the Continental Congress to the Inhabitants of the Province of
Quebec (Oct. 26, 1774) reprinted in 1 The Founders' Constitution, supra note 2, at 442
(jury trial as fundamental right); Virginia Ratifying Convention, Proposed Amendments
To The Constitution (June 27, 1788), reprinted in 1 The Founders' Constitution, supra
note 2, at 473 (trial by jury as "one of the greatest securities to the rights of the people").
Justice Chase, while exhorting a jury to convict a defendant of violating the Sedition Act,
said that "we all know that juries have the right to decide the law, as well as the fact," but
refused to concede during a discussion with the defense counsel that the jury could de-
clare a statute unconstitutional, insisting that task was for the court. United States v.
Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 253-57 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709). Chase did not satis-
factorily explain his inconsistency, which may have been motivated by fear that the jury
would invalidate the Sedition Act.
52. Justice Chase vigorously endorsed the Act. See J. Smith, supra note 2, at 324-27,
335, 352-56; 1 C. Warren, supra note 7, at 164-65. He also went to great lengths to
ensure its enforcement. For example, in the trial of James Callender for seditious libel,
Justice Chase refused to allow the testimony of any witness unless the testimony would,
standing alone, show the truth of the entire statement which was alleged to be libelous.
See United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 251 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709). At
Justice Chase's impeachment trial, Chief Justice Marshall commented that he had never
heard "that objection made by the court except in this particular case." L. Baker, John
Marshall: A Life In Law 433 (1974). Justice Chase also refused to allow the defendent to
argue the unconstitutionality of the Act to the jury. See supra note 51.
Justice Washington apparently upheld the Act's constitutionality in the trial of Charles
Holt, see J. Smith, supra note 2, at 381, but the only description of that jury charge comes
from the Federalist newspapers, see id., since the case does not appear in the Federal
Cases Reporters. Justice Iredell, in a charge to a grand jury, held the Act to be constitu-
tional. Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 836-40 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5,126). Justice Pater-
son, like Chase, prevented the jury from considering the Act's constitutionality and said
that its validity could not be disputed until it was declared void "by a tribunal competent
for the purpose." Lyon's Case, 15 F. Cas. 1183, 1185 (C.C.D. Vt. 1798) (No. 8,646).
Neither Paterson nor Chase explained which tribunal would be competent. Chase sug-
gested that constitutionality was an issue for the Court because appellate review by the
Supreme Court would ensure a uniform rule, see Callender, 25 F. Cas. at 257, which
ignored the Court's lack of appellate criminal jurisdiction. See supra note 49.
Chief Justice Marshall, who took his seat after the Act had expired, defended its con-
stitutionality, in the Report Of The Minority On The Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 22,
1799), reprinted in 5 The Founders' Constitution, supra note 2, at 136-39. On the other
hand, he questioned the wisdom of the Act, see Letter from John Marshall to a Free-
holder (Sept. 20, 1798), reprinted in 5 The Founders' Constitution, supra note 2, at 131.
and, as a member of Congress, voted for its repeal. See L. Baker, supra, at 304-06, 326.
53. Dilliard, Samuel Chase, in I The Justices Of The United States Supreme Court
185, 194 (L. Friedman & F. Israel ed. 1969).
54. Id.; see A. Beveridge, 3 The Life of John Marshall 37, 41 (1919); J. Smith, supra
note 2, at 184, 343.
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during prosecutions tried in his court,55 and missed part of the August
1800 term in order to campaign for President Adams.5" Partisan con-
duct by Chase and several other justices led Jefferson and the Anti-Fed-
eralists to condemn the judiciary,57 a charge with which historians have
agreed.58
The conduct of the federal judiciary helped provoke the popular reac-
tion that doomed the statute. 59 Congress refused to renew the Sedition
Act60 and President Jefferson pardoned those who had been convicted
and halted almost all pending prosecutions, including those instituted
against Federalist editors.6' Congress impeached Justice Chase, in part
for his zealous use of the statute,6 and Congress later refunded all fines
collected under the Act.63  The nation realized that it had made a
mistake.
Indeed, when a federal prosecution of two Federalist editors under the
common law of seditious libel reached the Court (having been over-
looked by Jefferson), the result was so predictable that both parties de-
55. See A. Beveridge, supra note 54, at 34-41; J. Smith, supra note 2, at 325-26, 356-
57; Dilliard, supra note 53, at 194.
56. C. Haines, The Role of The Supreme Court in American Government and Poli-
tics 176 (1944); 1 C. Warren, supra note 7, at 156 n.l.
57. Jefferson said that the federal bench had turned the grand jury system into a
"political engine." Letter from Jefferson to P. Fitzhugh (June 4, 1797), reprinted in 1 C.
Warren, supra note 7, at 165. Congressman William Giles likened the bench to "execu-
tive missionaries pronouncing political harangues." 7 Annals of Cong. 583 (1802).
58. See A. Beveridge, supra note 51, at 42-43, 49; C. Haines, supra note 56, at 175-77;
1 C. Warren, supra note 7, at 165-66; Kraus, William Paterson, in 1 The Justices Of The
United States Supreme Court, supra note 53, at 170. See generally J. Smith, supra note 2(detailed depiction of the trials conducted under the Sedition Act and the political biases
displayed by members of the Court).
Specific instances of bias deserve to be noted. Justice Paterson, in a grand jury charge,
described the Act's opponents, the Anti-Federalists, as "Jacobins," an epithet commonly
used to refer to French revolutionaries and anarchists. A. Beveridge, supra note 54, at 30
n.1; C. Haines, supra note 56, at 175; 1 C. Warren, supra note 7, at 166 n.2. While more
temperate than Chase, Paterson also earned a reputation as an avenger of the Federalist
cause. Kraus, supra, at 171. Justice Iredell lectured grand juries on political issues, see I
C. Warren, supra note 7, at 165-66, issued one grand jury charge that declared that the
Adams administration had been "grossly abused" by its critics, see Case of Fries, 9 Fed.
Cas. 826, 827 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5,126), lectured the same grand jury on the need for
the Alien and Sedition Acts, see id. at 830-41, and, at the request of several Federalists,
authorized widespread distribution of those comments, see id. at 841 n.3. Justice Ells-
worth, while a member of the Court, served as an ambassador under President Adams, I
C. Warren, supra note 7, at 167, leading Jefferson to label the Court as an auxiliary to the
executive branch. Jt
59. See A. Beveridge, supra note 54, at 41, 49.
60. See 6 Annals of Cong. 404, 419-20, 423 (1800).
61. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (July 22, 1804), cited in New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wil-
son Carey Nicholas (June 13, 1809), cited in Levy II, supra note 2, at 344. Levy points
out, however, that Jefferson tolerated, if not encouraged, common law prosecutions in
state courts. Levy II, supra note 2, at 340-41, 344-47; see also L. Levy, Jefferson and Civil
Liberties (1963).
62. 1 C. Warren, supra note 7, at 281-82.
63. Act of July 4, 1840, ch. 45, 6 Stat. 802.
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clined to appear for argument. 64 The defendants had been indicted for
common law, rather than statutory, seditious libel, and the Court held
that the validity of any indictment under federal common law had "been
long since settled in public opinion.",65 The Court said that there was no
federal common law of crimes and therefore the lower federal court
lacked jurisdiction over the case.6 6
Given the lack of federal criminal statutes, the Court's decision trans-
formed the United States from a country where it was illegal to criticize a
government official to a nation in which advocating insurrection was not
a federal crime. And while Justices Chase and Paterson had refused to
give juries a chance to serve as the protectors of personal rights, the
Court in 1828 would assume that role, going out of its way to warn Con-
gress against violating the rights of dissenters.67
B. Contempt of the Legislature
The death of the Sedition Act did not eliminate the danger that the
federal government would find other ways to stifle criticism. One poten-
tial means for chilling debate produced Anderson v. Dunn 68 and the
Supreme Court's first reference to freedom of speech and of the press.
The House of Representatives had "adjudged" Anderson guilty of
breaching the privilege of the House and of high contempt of the House's
dignity,69 although the record did not indicate the factual basis for the
findings.7" After Anderson was arrested, examined, reprimanded, and
released by the House, he sued the sergeant-at-arms for assault, battery,
and false imprisonment, claiming that the House had exceeded its
authority.71
The Court held that while the Constitution did not expressly give Con-
gress the power to punish outsiders for contempt, the right of Congress
to preserve itself and its authority meant that Congress had to be able to
punish those who disobeyed its subpoenas and orders.72 The Court ac-
knowledged that Parliament had abused this power in the past,73 and
tried to prevent similar congressional abuse by limiting the punishment
that Congress could inflict for contempt. Holding that the contempt
power should be "the least possible power adequate to the end pro-
posed,"7 4 the Court said that contempt could only be punished by im-
64. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32 (1812).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 33-34
67. See infra text accompanying notes 82-85.
68. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
69. Id. at 208-09.
70. Id. at 234.
71. Id. at 206-12. In the course of his arrest, Anderson alleged, he was subjected to
"beating, bruising, battering and ill-treating." Id. at 204.
72. Id. at 224-27.
73. Id. at 231.
74. Id. (emphasis deleted).
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prisonment, and could last only until the House had adjourned." In
addition, the Court suggested that public opinion would deter congres-
sional abuse of its contempt powers.76
Curiously, however, the Court limited only the extent of Congress'
ability to punish; it expressly did not restrict the grounds for which Con-
gress could punish. After noting that the record did not reveal the rea-
son for Anderson's arrest, the Court said it would "presume" that the
House would not have issued the warrant for Anderson's arrest without
adequate factual justification." This presumption was less blind defer-
ence to Congress than a recognition that a more complete record would
have shown that Anderson had been arrested for trying to bribe a mem-
ber of the House.78 The House debate over the incident consumed sev-
eral full days of debate,79 of which the Court could hardly have been
ignorant, and, indeed, the Court did make a thinly-veiled reference to the
actual facts of the case.8" The Court's informal knowledge of the facts
and the light punishment that Anderson received8" may have convinced
the Court to forgive the deficient record.
Given the facts of the case, it is surprising and significant that the
Court chose to consider the effect its decision might have on freedom of
speech and of the press. In what apparently was the Court's first refer-
ence to those two rights, Justice Johnson asked what would insure that
the House would "confine its punishing power to the limits of imprison-
ment, and not push it to the infliction of corporal punishment, or even
death, and exercise it in cases affecting the liberty of speech and of the
press?""2 His answer was that the members' own stake in the reputation
of the House plus the responsiveness of an elective body to public opinion
would serve to prevent such abuses.83
One could argue that the Court was being either naive or extremely
deferential. But the Marshall Court was neither, 4 and a naive or defer-
ential court would not have raised the issue in the first place. It is more
reasonable to conclude that the Court was cajoling Congress, giving no-
tice that it would be alert to congressional activity that impinged on the
75. Id. at 230-31.
76. Id. at 226.
77. Id. at 234.
78. See 31 Annals of Cong. 592-609, 611-702, 786-90 (1818).
79. The House first heard of Anderson's attempt on January 8. 1818, and devoted
almost its full attention to the matter from Jan. 9th to Jan. 16th. Id.
80. In discussing whether congressional contempt power extended outside the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the Court said that an inhabitant of Louisiana or Maine was just as
likely as a resident of the District to attempt, by letter, to bribe or corrupt a Congress-
man, which was precisely Anderson's alleged crime. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 204, 234 (1821).
81. Anderson was confined during the House's week-long debate on his case and then
released after a reprimand. Id. at 210-12.
82. Id. at 232.
83. See id.
84. See, eg., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
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first amendment. The change in the Court was clear. During the prior
tenure of Chief Justice Ellsworth, several justices had individually en-
dorsed Congress' power to silence its critics, and Justices Chase and Pat-
erson had blocked discussion as to constitutionality of that power." The
Marshall Court, by contrast, acted as a single body to warn Congress
that it would remain on guard against congressional activity that endan-
gered first amendment rights.
The Court remained silent on this issue for the next one hundred
years, but not because it had abandoned Anderson's dicta. Congress did
not again act to punish a critic until 1916,86 and, when it did, the Court
fulfilled Anderson's promise that the judiciary would protect citizens
against legislative excess. Marshall v. Gordon 87 arose out of an investiga-
tion into the activities of a labor organization to which a Congressman
belonged.88 A grand jury indicted the Congressman, who demanded that
a House subcommittee be formed to investigate the federal district attor-
ney's activities.8 9 The attorney publicly charged the subcommittee with
attempting to frustrate the grand jury's activities, 90 and used language
that the House found insulting. 9' It held the attorney in contempt.92
The attorney's request for habeas corpus enabled the Court to trans-
form Anderson's dicta into law. The Court admitted that the attorney's
language had been "manifestly ill-tempered" and "well calculated to
arouse the indignation" of the House.93 Although the Court also con-
ceded that Anderson had recognized that the Constitution impliedly gave
Congress the contempt power,94 it stressed that the contempt power in-
cluded "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed."95 That
end was the preservation of the legislature's ability to perform its duties,
and the Court flatly declared that criticism of the House, although it
might irritate or offend the members of the House, did not impede the
House's ability to perform its duties.96 It therefore was beyond the
bounds of the legislature's contempt authority, and the Court ordered
Congress to release the attorney.
97
85. See supra notes 51, 52.
86. See Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 543 n.l (1917) (listing cases involving
Congressional contempt power; all involved either physical assaults on members of Con-
gress or witnesses who refused to answer questions). But see Ex parte Nugent, 18 Fed.
Cas. 471, 482-83 (C.C.D.C. 1848) (No. 10,375) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 204 (1821) in dicta to support broad Congressional contempt power).
87. 243 U.S. 521 (1917).
88. Id. at 530-31.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 531-32.
91. Id. at 532.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 531-32.
94. Id. at 541.
95. Id. (emphasis deleted) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231
(1821)).
96. Marshall, 243 U.S. at 541, 543, 545-46.
97. Id. at 548.
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The Marshall decision effectively eliminated Congress' power to pun-
ish its critics by means of contempt. The Court limited the use of that
contempt power to parties that had obstructed the ability of Congress to
perform its tasks, and the Court established that criticism did not consti-
tute such an obstruction. Congress could punish those who physically
assaulted its members or refused to answer its questions,9" but it could
not punish those who disagreed with it.
C. The Developing Law of Libel
The law of libel, criminal and civil, remained in a state of flux through-
out the nineteenth century. As Professor Levy has shown, the conflict
over the Sedition Act caused new libertarian concepts of freedom of
speech and of the press to germinate,99 leading to the death of the Act
itself,'00 the more frequent use of truth as a defense in criminal ac-
tions, o0 ' and a significant increase in the power of juries in libel ac-
tions.'02 These developments provided additional protection to the press.
However, nearly all of this development occurred in the state courts and
the state constitutions. The Supreme Court heard only eleven cases re-
lated to defamation before 1917,1°1 and these decisions, for the most
98. See id. at 543.
99. See Levy II, supra note 2, at 282-348.
100. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
101. Compare People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N.Y. 1804) (criminal libel
defendent not permitted to prove truth of charges against governor) with Coleman v.
MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 723, 98 P. 281, 285-86 (1908) (no liability for good faith but
false criticism of public official). Justice Brennan devoted three pages to Coleman in his
landmark opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280-82 (1964). Before
1789 no state had said that truth was a defense in criminal trials. Levy II, supra note 2, at
196-98. A number of state constitutions adopted after 1789 however, did admit truth as
evidence in criminal libel actions. See infra note 149. The use of truth as a defense in
civil libel actions had long been recognized. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *150-
51.
102. See, eg., Ark. Const. of 1836, art. II, § 8 (in all criminal libel indictments, jury to
determine law and facts); Conn. Const. of 1818, art. I, § 7 (jury determines law and facts
"under the direction of the court" in criminal libel indictments); Del. Const. of 1792, art.
I, § 5 (jury determines facts and law in all criminal libel indictments); Ky. Coast. of 1792,
art. XII, § 8 (jury determines law and facts "under the direction of the court" in criminal
libel indictments); N.J. Const. of 1844, art. 1, § 5 (jury determines law and fact in all libel
prosecutions or indictments); N.Y. Const. of 1846, art. I, § 8 (same); Pa. Const. of 1790,
art. III, § 7 (jury to determine law and facts under court's direction in all criminal libel
indictments).
103. See supra note 15. This section does not discuss two cases that dealt with libel of
private individuals regarding private matters. See Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185
(1909) (unauthorized use of woman's likeness in whiskey advertisement); Pollard v.
Lyon, 91 U.S. 225 (1875) (accusation of immoral conduct against a woman). Although
these eleven cases constitute the largest single group of free speech and press cases before
World War I, they are a minute fraction of the defamation cases that state courts heard.
Actions for libel and slander were quite common even in the early state courts: Virginia
courts published twenty opinions in defamation cases between 1791 and 1820; Kentucky
courts issued 43 between 1801 and 1835; Massachusetts published forty during the same
time; and New York courts issued 29 between 1799 and 1833. Contemporary treatises
cite thousands of state defamation cases. See, e.g., 2 J. Kent's Commentaries *16-26; M.
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part, merely reflected developments in state law. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court cases reveal nineteenth century attitudes toward criticism
of government and its officials.
The most striking thing about the Supreme Court cases is the source of
the law they used. The Supreme Court made frequent use of treatises,
English cases, and state court cases.'" Curiously, however, it used state
cases without considering the appropriate state constitutions, many of
which had provisions guaranteeing freedom of the press and providing
special rules of evidence for libel. 105 Those provisions differed from state
to state and should have affected the decisions of the particular state
courts. The Supreme Court's use of state decisions without considering
the state constitutions indicates that the Court did not believe the provi-
sions significantly influenced the actions of state supreme courts. 0 6 Fur-
thermore, this belief may have been justified, for state courts rarely, if
ever, discussed the free press provisions of their state constitutions in
connection with libel. 17 Similarly, after the lower federal courts gained
jurisdiction over federal questions, libel cases from the District of Colum-
bia and the territories that made their way to the Supreme Court did not
invoke the first amendment.'0 8
In deciding libel cases, the major concern of the nineteenth century
courts was malice. This was the primary issue of the first Supreme Court
libel case, White v. Nicholls. °9 By the time the Court reached the issue,
most state courts recognized that truth could be a defense to a charge of
criminal libel, provided the truth was published with good intentions and
Newell, The Law of Slander and Libel (1914); J. Townshend, Treatise on the Wrongs
Called Slander and Libel (1890). Very few of these state decisions found their way to the
U.S. Supreme Court, because they were considered to involve only issues of state law not
a federal right. See Abbott v. Tacoma Bank of Commerce, 175 U.S. 409, 411-14 (1899)
(denying for lack of jurisdiction an appeal from Washington Supreme Court decision as
to existence of absolute privilege for court pleadings). Thus, the failure of the Court to
apply the first amendment to the states until 1925 is only part of the reason for the
perceived absence of appellate jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 18-23.
104. See, e.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 151-53 (1904) (citing state cases and
treatises); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 496-97 (1896) (citing cases from Queen's
Bench and House of Lords); Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1884) (citing state
court and English cases); White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266, 285-292 (1845) (citing
state court cases, English cases, and treatises).
105. See supra note 99 and infra note 146.
106. The only free press case that did discuss a state constitutional provision made no
attempt to distinguish it from the first amendment. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 241-45 (1915).
107. Indeed, a number of state constitutions expressly said that citizens, though en-
joying freedom of the press, were responsible for the abuse of that right. See, eg., Ala.
Const. of 1819, art. I, § 8; Ark. Const. of 1836, art. II, § 7; Conn. Const. of 1818, art. I,
§ 5; Del. Const. of 1792, art. I, § 5; Ky. Const. of 1792, art. XII, § 7; N.J. Const. of 1844,
art. I, § 5; N.Y. Const. of 1821, art. VII, § 8.
108. See, e.g., Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 101 (1914); Baker v. Warner, 231
U.S. 588, 591-94 (1913); Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U.S. 165 (1913); Gandia v. Pettinhill, 222
U.S. 452, 458-59 (1912); Pickford v. Talbott, 211 U.S. 199 (1908); Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S. 138, 150-55 (1904); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 495-99 (1904).
109. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845).
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for justifiable ends, that is, without malice. "' Unfortunately, as White
demonstrates, it was difficult to apply such a standard to the normal
political libel action and risky for a defendant to allow a jury to try a libel
case. White sued the defendants after they wrote a letter opposing his
appointment to a federal government position. The letter contended that
White had uttered "one of the vilest calumnies ever issued by a band of
thoughtless and irresponsible individuals" against a presidential candi-
date."' The defendants' letter also requested the appointment of one of
their colleagues instead of White." 2 White sued, asking the Court to
decide what protection against criticism public officials or candidates for
public office should be accorded.' 13
Before the Court confronted that issue, it addressed the issue of mal-
ice, albeit in a somewhat confusing manner. It began by saying that
White's allegations satisfied the requirement that malice be specially
pleaded." 4 Although one might conclude from the wording of the opin-
ion that malice and falsity were two different matters, the Court also said
that an allegation that the criticism was "false" sufficiently pleaded mali-
cious intent."I s
The Court's explanation of implied malice created additional potential
for confusion. The Court said that a statement that was calculated to
make the plaintiff appear "infamous, or odious, or ridiculous" would im-
ply that it was made with malice." 6 But what if that infamy or ridicule
was deserved? And how should the Court's rule apply when a speaker's
motivations were mixed? The defendants in White may have ridiculed
White in an attempt to rid government of an unworthy servant, but, as
their nomination of a replacement suggests, they also may have been mo-
tivated to advance a friend's interest. Was that enough to justify a finding
of malice? The Court's concern with the speaker's motivation rather
than the speaker's belief in the truthfulness of his or her statement posed
a significant danger to would-be critics of government officials.
That danger was increased by the means that plaintiffs could use to
prove malice. White recognized that malice could be inferred simply
from the publication itself. Indeed, the White Court ruled that the plain-
tiff was entitled to present the libelous material to the jury for precisely
that purpose." 7 White also said that malice could be shown by the facts
and circumstances connected with the material or with the situation of
the parties, although the trial court could never require more proof of
110. Id.at 289 (citing Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 149 (3 Tyng) 154 (1808)).
111. White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266, 268 (1844).
112. Id. at 269.
113. Id. at 285.
114. Id. White alleged that defendants "falsely, wickedly, and maliciously composed
and published" the criticism and that the defendants acted "'maliciously and wickedly,
intending to injure the plaintiff in his character." Id. at 284.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 291.
117. Id. at 287, 292.
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malice from the plaintiff than the publication itself. "' The basic rule was
that when publication was proved, malice could be inferred from the
publication's language, although the defendant had the opportunity to
explain the language." 9
At first glance, White and the nineteenth century libel law it represents
seem inconsistent with modem libel law, especially the pronouncement
of New York Times v. Sullivan that the first amendment bars liability for
criticism of a public official unless the statement was made with knowl-
edge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false
or not.'2 ' White itself, however, approvingly quoted an early Massachu-
setts decision that said "that if the defendant had proceeded with honest
intentions, believing the accusation to be true, although in fact it was not,
he would be entitled to protection, and that the occasion of the publica-
tion would prevent the legal inference of malice." 12' White also cited an
English case that spoke of statements made "maliciously, and without
probable cause."1 22 Later Supreme Court cases also made this connec-
tion. 23 Thus, although the Court did not base its probable cause lan-
guage on constitutional grounds, the Court's repeated references to
probable cause as a libel defense provides historical support for the mod-
em standard for libel of public officials.
Nineteenth century Supreme Court libel cases also reflected the
growth of the doctrine of privilege, the concept that some types of state-
ments should enjoy special protection. By 1844, qualified privilege was
given to statements made in discharge of a public or personal duty (such
as words of caution spoken to a friend), an employer's assessment of his
servant's character, words used in judicial proceedings, and publications
made in legislative proceedings, such as petitions to Parliament. 2 4 In a
normal libel case, the existence of malice was presumed from the fact of
publication, and the defendant had to show that the statement was made
without malice.' 25 With qualified privilege, there was no such presump-
118. Id. at 287.
119. Id. at 286.
120. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
121. White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266, 290 (1844) (quoting Bodwell v. Osgood,
20 Mass. 408, 412, 3 Pick. 379, 384 (1825)). White did not base this rule on the Constitu-
tion but presumably proclaimed it as a matter of federal common law. Cf Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1842) (applying federal common law to a contract dispute
based on diversity jurisdiction).
122. White, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 289 (quoting Fairman v. Ives, 5 Barn. & Aid. 642, 648,
106 Eng. Rep. 1325, 1328 (K.B. 1822)).
123. See, e.g., Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U.S. 165, 182 (1913) (Court discussing school sys-
tem's criticism of a teacher, said that the rule of White is "that [a statement] is not to be
deemed malicious unless found to be false, as well as without probable cause."); Philadel-
phia, W. & B. R.R. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 202, 214 (1858) (because corporation
had investigated its allegations about the skills of a builder, the trial court should have
instructed the jury that the presumption of malice had been rebutted).
124. See White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266, 286-87 (1844).
125. Id. at 286.
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tion, so the plaintiff had to prove malice.' 26
Later Supreme Court cases reflect the growth of the scope of privilege.
In 1884, the Court held that complaints presented to a district attorney
about allegedly illegal acts were absolutely privileged for public policy
reasons.127 In 1899, the Court dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, a
Washington Supreme Court case that held that statements made in peti-
tions or complaints filed with a court also enjoyed absolute privilege be-
cause of public policy.' 2' The Court also recognized that statements
made by an executive officer in pursuit of his official duties should enjoy
absolute immunity. 129 Furthermore, Justice Holmes, writing for the
Court in 1912, discussing accusations of "monstrous immorality" against
the U.S. Attorney for Puerto Rico,'3 ' said that the plaintiff was a "pub-
lic officer in whose course of action connected with his office the citizens
of [Puerto] Rico had a serious interest, and anything bearing on such
action was a legitimate subject of statement and comment. It was so at
least in the absence of express malice."'' The Court held that the com-
ments did not go beyond "reasonable limits."'132
In short, the Court's early libel decisions do not fully reflect the tre-
mendous changes in libel law that occurred during the nineteenth cen-
tury. But the use of probable cause as a defense, the recognition of
qualified privilege, and the development of absolute privilege indicate
that the Court was concerned with giving some protection to political
commentary, and those decisions set the stage for the development of
modern libel law.
D. A Bastion of Seditious Libel
In its decisions involving critics of government institutions or officials,
the Supreme Court gave the least protection to the single litigant who
criticized the judiciary. "' Although the Court protected those who
questioned the other branches of government, a critic of the judiciary
was quite another matter.
Three reasons may account for this difference. Public comments and
criticism can pressure a judge, influence his decisions and deprive liti-
126. Id at 287.
127. Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 314-16 (1884).
128. Abbott v. Tacoma Bank of Commerce, 175 U.S. 409 (1899).
129. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498-99 (1896).
130. Gandia v. Pettingill, 222 U.S. 452, 457 (1912).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Prior to the decisions on judicial contempt power, the Court rebuffed efforts by
the legislative and executive branches of government to punish detractors. See supra text
accompanying notes 64-85, 99-109 (discussing United States Y. Hudson and Goodwin, An-
derson, and White and its successors). Following Patterson r. Colorado, the Court
blocked President Roosevelt's efforts to gag the press, see United States v. Press Publish-
ing Co., 219 U.S. 1 (1911) and infra text accompanying notes 172-94, and barred Con-
gress from applying the legislative contempt power to those who criticized it. See
Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917), and supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
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gants of the impartial decision-maker that they deserve. Unlike most
public officials, judges are prevented by judicial ethics from responding to
attacks. Furthermore, Supreme Court protection of a critic of a state
court might boomerang: if criticism of a lower court was protected,
would not criticism of the nation's highest court also be protected? The
tensions between these concerns and the first amendment culminated in
Patterson v. Colorado,34 a harsh and irrational decision that rests more
on the Court's concern with protecting courts from criticism than on any
reasoned interpretation of the first amendment.
In 1905, a Colorado newspaper owned by a Democratic United States
Senator, Thomas Patterson, attacked the five Republicans on the Colo-
rado Supreme Court. 35 Charged with contempt, Patterson claimed
truth as a defense, and his answer described the court's alleged corrup-
tion in deciding several interrelated cases. 1 36 The court had not issued an
opinion in one of the cases, and petitions for rehearing were awaiting the
court's attention in the others.1 37 Patterson's accusations and his polit-
ical status made it clear that he was pressuring the court to change its
decisions. The Colorado court, in a purely partisan opinion, 3 held Pat-
terson in contempt for attempting to influence it in pending cases, and he
appealed.
Justice Holmes writing for the Court upheld the state court in a three-
part opinion. The first part accepted the state court's finding that the
cases still were pending when Patterson commented on them. 139 Justice
134. 205 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1907).
135. The articles are reprinted in People v. News-Times Publishing Co., 35 Colo. 253,
256-71, 84 P. 912, 913-19 (1906).
136. The articles and the answer charged that the court had issued injunctions that
allowed and endorsed wide-spread election rigging in order to secure the confirmation of
two Republicans as members of the court. 35 Colo. at 281-355, 84 P. at 921-44 (answer
of respondent).
137. Patterson and the court agreed that one case had not been decided at the time of
the articles. 35 Colo. at 281, 84 P. at 921 (answer of respondent), 35 Colo. at 357, 84 P.
at 945 (opinion of the court). The Colorado court did not say whether any other articles
appeared before the rehearing petitions were filed, only that the motions were on file
before the last offensive article appeared. The court also said that it granted all but one of
the rehearing motions and modified substantially each of its original decisions. 35 Colo.
at 356-57, 84 P. at 944-45.
138. Neither Justice Goddard nor Justice Bailey, whose appointments allegedly were
secured through the claimed election-rigging, recused themselves. They and the three
other justices whom Patterson had lambasted provided five of the six votes that convicted
their accuser. 35 Colo. at 256-57, 84 P. at 913-19. The sole dissent was by Justice Steele,
who had dissented in all of the criticized cases and who had been praised by Patterson in
his articles. Curiously, Patterson also had praised Justice Gunter, who wrote the major-
ity opinion.
The partisanship of state judges was widespread at the time. In 1906, Roscoe Pound
said that the selection of state judges by partisan election had "almost destroyed the
traditional respect for the bench." Address to the American Bar Ass'n Annual Conven-
tion (1906), The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, re-
printed in 46 J. Am. Judicature Soc'y 55, 66 (1962).
139. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 460 (1907). Justice Holmes' broad deference
to the state court's determination was disturbing, for it would have allowed a state court
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Holmes further agreed that Patterson improperly had tried to influence
the Colorado court in regard to several pending cases.'" Importantly,
however, Justice Holmes drastically limited the scope of his rule. He
declared that once a decision was final, the court that had issued it was
"subject to the same criticism as other people."'' In effect, this meant
that although a court must base its decision solely on evidence and argu-
ments presented in the courtroom and therefore should be shielded from
public commentary, once the judicial process is complete, the public's
interest in a robust discussion of the court's decision becomes
paramount. 142
In the second part of Patterson, Justice Holmes said that he would not
decide whether the fourteenth amendment applied the first amendment
to broadly define the term "pending case" to prevent the Supreme Court from consider-
ing the federal free speech issues involved. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 368
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Today, the Supreme Court considers the facts of the
situation and the state's general practice to determine if anything remains to be judged;
the state court's determination is not controlling. See, eg., Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619,
620 (1981); Market St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548, 551 (1945); Department
of Banking v. Pink, 317 U.S. 264, 268 (1942); Wick v. Superior Court, 278 U.S. 574, 575
(1928).
The cases involved in Patterson were pending even under this less deferential test, for
one case had not been decided and the court was considering motions for rehearing in the
others. See Department of Banking, 317 U.S. at 266 (timely rehearing petition in state
court stays finality of the judgment).
Holmes would have restricted free speech had he said that a case was pending until the
time to seek a rehearing had expired, because a state court could establish a long filing
period to delay criticism and reduce its effectiveness. In Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255
(1923), the trial court had held that a case was pending as long as it was open to modifica-
tion, appeal, or rehearing. See Ex parte Craig, 274 F. 177, 187 (2d Cir. 1921), rerld, 282
F. 138 (2d Cir. 1922), affd sub nom. Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255 (1923). But see Ne-
braska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1976) (prompt publication important
if the press is to fulfill its duties). There is no evidence that Holmes favored this rule, and
later he expressly rejected it, saying that the test should be whether anything is awaiting
decision at the time the criticism is published, which is the essence of the modern rule.
See Craig, 263 U.S. at 281 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
140. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). It is possible that the Colorado
court's contempt decision would have been upheld even under the test used in Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). In that case, the Court reversed a state contempt convic-
tion, saying that the state court should have expected the criticism that was published
and that courts can punish only those utterances whose substantive evil is extremely seri-
ous and highly imminent. Id. at 263, 270, 273. Arguably, Patterson's articles satisfied
that test.
141. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 463 (1907). A number of state cases prior to
Patterson had also held that criticism about completed cases could not be punished for
contempt. See, e.g., Storey v. Illinois, 79 I11. 45, 48-53 (1875); Cheadle v. State, 110 Ind.
301, 11 N.E. 426, 430-32 (1887); State v. Anderson, 40 Iowa 207, 208-09 (1875); State v.
Dunham, 6 Iowa 254, 261-66, 6 Coles 246, 253-58 (1858); Percival v. State, 45 Neb. 741,
64 N.W. 221, 222-23 (1895).
142. It is worth mentioning that other public officials can defend themselves in the
media, but judicial ethics prevent a judge from responding to his critics. Indeed, Patter-
son has been cited for the proposition that no publication about a completed case can be
punished as contemptuous. State ex rel. Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Coleman, 347 Mo.
1238, 1257-58, 152 S.W.2d 640, 647 (1941).
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to the states. 143 The Court had rejected explicitly incorporation argu-
ments in earlier cases,'" but Holmes did not cite those decisions.
Whatever the significance of this omission in Holmes's opinion, it was
overshadowed by the grounds on which he based the decision. Holmes
went on to explain why the first amendment, even if it applied, would not
protect Patterson.
In the first place, the main purpose of such constitutional provisions is
"to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been
practiced by other governments," and they do not prevent the subse-
quent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public
welfare.... The preliminary freedom extends as well to the false as to
the true; the subsequent punishment may extend as well to the true as
to the false.
14 5
This was a narrow and dangerous interpretation of the first amendment.
Developed by Sir William Blackstone, this theory of press held that
although the government could not prevent publication of even false
speech, after publication it could punish even true speech.' 46 This inter-
pretation provided little protection for publishers. Although it prevented
formal licensing systems to block publication of offensive material, the
government could effectively block such publications merely by imposing
severe post-publication penalties.1 47
143. 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). Justice Harlan's dissent argued that while the first
amendment expressly barred only Congress from abridging freedom of speech, the
amendment also implicitly recognized freedom of speech and of the press as rights cn-
joyed by all United States citizens. Id. at 464-65 (Harlan, J. dissenting). If this was true,
then the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment barred the states
from infringing those first amendment rights. Id.
144. The Court had said for decades that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.
See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372, 379-80 (1905); Lloyd v. Dollison, 194
U.S. 445, 447 (1904); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586-87 (1900); Spies v. Illinois, 123
U.S. 131, 166 (1887); Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833).
The Court also had considered whether the privileges and immunities clause rectified that
lack of coverage in Spies, but did not decide the question. 123 U.S. at 165-66, 170. In
Maxwell, Justice Peckham's opinion for the Court rejected the idea, stating that under
the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542 (1875), responsibility for the protection of life and liberty within a state rested with
that state alone. See Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 592-93. Peckham regarded federal privileges to
be the right to conduct business, to own, buy and sell property, to make contracts, to
enforce them and to protect one's property in a court of law, and the right of a non-
resident to be free of taxes and burdens that were not imposed on a state's residents. Id.
at 593-94. This distinction between civil rights (rights necessary to live and work in a
society) and political rights (rights used to participate in governing society) was a com-
mon nineteenth century concept. See, e.g., Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 15
(1906); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
367-68 (1879) (Field & Clifford, J.J., dissenting); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 508 (1877)
(Clifford, J., concurring). The Court finally held in 1925 that the equal protection clause
applied the first amendment to state conduct. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925).
145. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
146. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *151-52.
147. See Z. Chafee, supra note 13, at 9-12. Professor Chafee also condemned Black-
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Furthermore, there was little support for Holmes's endorsement of
Blackstone. The authority Holmes cited was flawed,' 4 and he ignored a
number of early state constitutions that made truth a defense in libel
actions, thereby repudiating Blackstone's theory.' 49 The weakness of
stone's doctrine because it protected blackmailers but not political dissenters and because
of Blackstone's anti-republican sentiments. Id.
148. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (citing Commonwealth v.
Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304 (1825) and Respublica v. Oswald, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 319
(1788)). In Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304 (1825), the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court said that truth was not a defense,
not... because the law makes no distinction between truth and falsehood, but
because the interest of the public requires that men not invested with authority
by the laws, shall not usurp the power of public accusation, and arraign before
the public, with malicious motives, their neighbours and fellow citizens, expos-
ing them to partial trials in forms not warranted by the constitution or laws.
Blanding, 20 Mass. at 312. Under this theory, accusations were to be made solely to the
government or other body that had the authority to deal with them. Thus, the court said
complaints about a government officer should be made to the legislature and those against
a minister to his church. Id. at 316-17. The theory has some attraction: it seems aimed
at preventing trial by the press, in which the victim often has little or no means to defend
himself. Cf Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (Florida stat-
ute requiring newspaper to give reply space to political candidate it criticized held uncon-
stitutional). But the theory has several problems. First, as the court mentioned,
legislative and court proceedings are public, Blanding, 20 Mass. at 314, so accusations
made to those bodies could be as damaging as those made through the press. Second, in
many cases, the accusations should be made to the public, because they concern people
(such as political candidates and elected public officials) who are responsible only to the
public. Third, Blanding recognized that in certain cases involving emergencies, public
accusations were permissible because the delays inherent in official proceedings could not
be tolerated. Id at 319. Quite frequently, the difference between an emergency and a
non-emergency would be difficult to discern.
Under these justifications, it could be argued that Patterson's articles were proper: the
Colorado Supreme Court was responsible to the public, and the dangers of a corrupt
judiciary are at least as imminent and serious as "gross swindling," which the Blanding
court had said was an emergency situation.
Moreover, Blanding had provided examples of cases in which truth was a defense. The
court said these included, but were not limited to, reports of legislative and judicial pro-
ceedings, complaints made to any "public constituted body" of the wrongdoing of one of
its officers, and "cases of mere private import," such as an honest but erroneous assess-
ment of a servant's character and abilities. Id. at 314-15. The court said that these ex-
ceptions "go far to render harmless that much decried rule, that the truth is no defense."
Id. at 315.
Finally, neither Blanding nor Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319 (1788), cited
in Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462, were sound precedent. The Blanding court pointed out that
after the opinion's oral reading and its publication, Massachusetts enacted legislation al-
lowing evidence of the truth to be admitted in all defamation actions. 20 Mass. (3 Pick.)
at 315 n.1. Although Oswald appeared at 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319 (1788), that volume con-
tains only cases from the Pennsylvania state courts and the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1790 should have overturned the Oswald decision. See Pa. Const. of 1790 art. IX, § 7
(truth admissible in actions stemming from discussion of public officials or public
matter ).
149. See, e.g., Ark. Const. of 1836, art. II, § 8 (truth admissible in libel action concern-
ing discussion of public officials or public matters); Cal. Const. of 1849, art. I, § 9 (truth
published with good motives and justifiable ends defense in criminal libel actions); Colo.
Const. of 1876, art. II, § 10 (truth always admissible); Conn. Const. of 1818, art. I § 7
(truth admissible in all libel actions); Del. Const. of 1792, art. I. § 5 (truth admissible in
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Holmes's position was made quite clear within a decade, when federal
prosecutors in the Espionage Cases recognized that truth was a de-
fense. '5 Indeed, Holmes privately described this aspect of Patterson
quite simply: "I surely was ignorant."'' 51
The reason for Holmes's statements appeared in the final part of his
opinion, where he argued that criticism of a court in a pending case could
influence a jury. 52 Since Senator Patterson had criticized an appellate
court, and hence no jury could be influenced, Holmes added that outside
criticism also could improperly influence a judge. 53 Therefore, the judge
should cite a publisher for contempt if the publication interfered with the
court's judicial function.' 54 This meant that the judge would decide a
case in which he was the target of criticism.'55 Holmes's justification for
this conflict was feeble. Holmes failed to cite a 1905 Supreme Court case
that had stressed the right of every contempt defendant to an impartial
judge.'56 The case that he did cite, United States v. Shipp, was easily
distinguishable-it involved a defendant who had failed to obey a
Supreme Court order to protect a prisoner from a lynch mob. '5 7 Patter-
son had not merely offended the Colorado court in its official capacity by
failing to obey an order; he had offended the court's members in their
individual capacities by attacking their integrity. The Colorado justices
were precisely the partial judges that the Court had earlier warned
against.158 Furthermore, Holmes's argument was internally inconsistent.
libel actions concerning discussion of public officials or public matters); Fla. Const. of
1838, art. I, § 15 (truth admissible in libel actions concerning public officials or public
matters); Ill. Const. of 1818, art. VIII, § 23 (truth admissible in libel actions concerning
public officials or public matters); Ind. Const. of 1816, art. I, § 10 (same); Iowa Const. of
1857, art. I, § 7 (truth published with good motives and justifiable ends is defense); Ky.
Const., art. XII, § 8 (truth admissible in libels of public officials or public matters); Mich.
Const. of 1835, art. I, § 7 (truth published with good motives and justifiable ends is de-
fense); Miss. Const. of 1817, art. I, § 8 (truth always admissible); Mo. Const. of 1820, art.
XII, § 16 (same); N.J. Const. of 1844, art. I, § 5 (truth published with good motives and
justifiable ends is defense); N.Y. Const. of 1897, art. I, § 8 (truth published with good
motives and justifiable ends is defense in all criminal libel actions); Pa. Const. of 1790,
art. IX, § 7 (truth admissible in actions stemming from discussion of public officials or
public matters).
150. See Bogen, supra note 12, at 148 (quoting from Brief for United States 80-82,
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919)).
151. Bogen, supra note 12, at 100 (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to
Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (June 12, 1922) Box 14, folder 12, Zechariah Chafee, Jr. Papers (on
file at Manuscript Division, Harvard Law School Library)).
152. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 463.
155. Justice Holmes argued that the grounds for punishing contempt are impersonal:
"No doubt judges naturally would be slower to punish when the contempt carried with it
a personally dishonoring charge, but a man cannot expect to secure immunity from pun-
ishment by the proper tribunal, by adding to illegal conduct a personal attack." Id. at
463 (citing United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 574 (1906)).
156. See McGuire v. Blount, 199 U.S. 142, 143 (1905).
157. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1906).
158. See McGuire v. Blount, 199 U.S. 142, 143 (1905); see also State ex rel. Attorney
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If judges were able to ignore personal attacks and punish contempt on
impersonal grounds, then why was Holmes's concerned that outside crit-
icism could influence a judge's decision on the merits of the case?
Holmes completely failed to recognize the personal involvement of the
Colorado judges in the cases.
The best-though far from satisfactory-explanation for the flaws in
Holmes's opinion is that he was concerned about attacks on courts in
Colorado and across the nation. Patterson's attacks were part of an in-
tense, often violent, conflict between labor and business in Colorado,
with frequent pitched battles between miners and state troops. Is' Holmes
clearly abhorred this violence: two years after Patterson he approved the
conduct of a Colorado governor who had declared one county to be in a
state of insurrection and then jailed the county's labor leader for nearly
three months without charges or the benefit of habeas corpus." Mean-
while, the Populist and Progressive parties were levying equally threaten-
ing political attacks on the judiciary. Theodore Roosevelt advocated
popular recall of state court decisions, 6' Samuel Gompers and several
congressmen contended that Congress could overturn Supreme Court de-
cisions, 62 and at least one bill introduced in Congress would have made
all federal judges subject to regular elections. 63 It may have been that
these factors, coupled with Patterson's irregular conduct, pushed Holmes
too far.164
Significantly, Holmes recanted after pressures had eased. He privately
repudiated Patterson, 65 and he dissented in two later cases in which the
majority upheld contempt orders against newspaper editors. 1 66 In one
case, a newspaper repeatedly had criticized a judge in a pending case.'"
Holmes said that contempt was improper unless the criticism actually
General v. Circuit Court, 97 Wisc. 1, 12, 72 N.W. 193, 196 (1897) (reversing contempt
conviction of newspaper editor by judge who had been criticized by the editor).
159. See C. Abbott, S. Leonard & David McComb, Colorado: A History of the
Centennial State 138-55 (rev. ed. 1982). At least one Colorado court was treated to a
display of military power by a reluctant litigant. In 1903, the state's adjutant general
arrested several labor leaders without a warrant and then produced them in response to a
habeas corpus order only after he had surrounded the courthouse with armed troops,
placed snipers on nearby rooftops, and stationed a Gatling gun outside. Id. at 147-48.
160. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 82-83 (1909).
161. A. Bickel & B. Schmidt, Jr., The Judiciary and Responsible Government, 1910-
1921, at 14 (1984); A. Ekirch, Progressivism in America 163 (1974).
162. P. Murphy, The Meaning of Freedom of Speech 259 (1972).
163. See Robbins, Abolishing Life Tenure for Federal Judges, 70 Cent. L.J. 338 (May 6,
1910); see also A. Bickel & B. Schmidt, supra note 161, at 14; 2 C. Warren, supra note 7,
at 743 n.1.
164. In an earlier case, the Court had taken a much more restrained approach to a
newspaper's editorial attacks on the Court's expected position on cases then being argued
before it. See 2 C. Warren, supra note 7, at 55-56.
165. See supra text accompanying note 151.
166. See Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 280-82 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Toledo
Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 422-26 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
167. Toledo Newspaper Co., 247 U.S. at 422-23 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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would obstruct the administration of justice,'68 a far more lenient test
than he had used in Patterson. The trial judge had said that he had toler-
ated six months of abusive criticism before issuing the contempt, but
Holmes said that this showed that no emergency existed and that the
administration of justice probably had not been blocked. 69
In the end, Patterson is of little value as an early interpretation of the
first amendment. Patterson reflects its own unique factual circumstances
and the Court's desire to protect judicial authority. This protective in-
stinct was particularly strong when Patterson was decided due to preva-
lent political conflicts at the time. Therefore, it cannot be considered a
reasoned interpretation of the first amendment.
E. The Last Gasp of Seditious Libel
Just three years after Patterson, the Supreme Court produced an im-
portant victory for the press. In United States v. Press Publishing Co.,
the Court prevented an angry president from using federal prosecutors
and federal courts to resurrect seditious libel to punish his critics.
Shortly before the 1908 presidential election, articles in the Indianapo-
lis News and Joseph Pulitzer's New York World suggested that friends of
President Theodore Roosevelt and presidential candidate William How-
ard Taft had profited from the government's purchase of the Panama
Canal.1 7 ' Roosevelt attacked both newspapers, and the World responded
by charging him with deliberate misstatements of fact. 172 In a special
message to Congress, Roosevelt described the World's charges as "a libel
upon the United States Government" and said that Pulitzer should be
prosecuted for libel by the government. 73 The government began crimi-
nal proceedings in federal court, alleging that since copies of the World's
editorials had been distributed on federal land at West Point Military
Academy in New York, the World had committed a federal crime.' 74
The indictment presented three dangers to the nation's press. First, as
168. Id.
169. Id. at 425 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
170. 219 U.S. 1 (1911).
171. D. Seitz, Joseph Pulitzer: His Life and Letters 352-54 (1924). For other accounts
of Press Publishing's factual background, see J. Barrett, Joseph Pulitzer and His World
227-252 (1941); W. Bleyer, Main Currents in the History of American Journalism 346-49
(1927 & photo. reprint 1973); W. Swanberg, Pulitzer 365-78 (1967); J. Tebbel, supra note
28, at 210-13.
172. D. Seitz, supra note 171, at 357-64.
173. Id. at 364.
174. See United States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U.S. 1, 2 (1911). Roosevelt had
initially ordered federal attorneys to file an indictment in Indianapolis, but the local fed-
eral attorney refused and resigned, and the federal court dismissed the case. See The
Roosevelt Indictments, 38 Nat'l Corp. Rep. 153, 153 (March 18, 1909); J. Tebbel, supra
note 28, at 212. Indictments were also filed against the World in Washington, D.C., but
they were also withdrawn. Finally, under pressure from the President, an indictment was
obtained in the Southern District of New York, see Press Publishing, 219 U.S. at 2, one of
the last acts of Roosevelt's administration. The Roosevelt Indictments, supra, at 153.
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Roosevelt's address to Congress had shown, he was trying to revive sedi-
tious libel, and contemporary law journals criticized him for this.'7 The
second concern was Roosevelt's use of the Assimilative Act, 76 to estab-
lish a federal common law of libel, thereby avoiding important safe-
guards of state libel laws.' 77 The third danger was that a federal criminal
libel law-whether labeled seditious libel or not-would enable a thin-
skinned president to invoke the full resources of the federal government
against a newspaper.' 78
The threat to the nation's press was clear. Even though the federal
trial court dismissed the indictment against officials of the World for lack
175. See The Roosevelt Indictments, supra note 174, at 153 (indictments "based upon a
policy differing only in degree" from seditious libel); Robbins, The Action of the Govern-
ment Against the New York World as a Revival of the Offense of Scandalum Magnatum,
68 Cent. L.J 135, 135 (Feb. 19, 1909) (criticizing charges as based on English concepts of
seditious libel that had been repudiated by the American colonies); Kerr, World Libel, 68
Cent. L.J. 253, 254 (April 2, 1909) ("a dangerous and unnecessary precedent,-a rolling
back of the wheels of time and the development of society"); see also The Panama Libel
Case, 24 Bench & Bar 43, 47 (1911) (stating that the days of seditious libel are long gone).
But see Authority and Precedent in Libel Cases, 44 The Law Journal 42 (Jan. 23, 1909)
(English journal defending President relying solely on English law).
176. Assimilative Act, ch. 576, 30 Stat. 717, § 2 (1898) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 13 (1948)).
177. The Act assimilated state criminal law by providing that a person accused of
committing a crime on federal land was to be tried in federal court under federal law,
although any punishment was to be the same as that specified under state law. See id.
The Assimilative Act was necessary because the Court had said that there were no federal
common law crimes, see United States v. Hudson, I1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33-34 (1812),
and Congress had not passed special statutes making such crimes as robbery and murder
into federal crimes when committed on federal land.
Federal lands included post offices, and the government contended that a separate
crime occurred each time a libelous article was brought onto federal property. United
States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1911) (argument of government). A news-
paper that mailed copies to subscribers in several states would have found itself subject to
prosecutions in each of the federal districts through whose post offices the copies had
travelled, with the attendant high costs of defending against multiple lawsuits. In con-
trast, many states-including New York-had statutes that allowed only a single crimi-
nal action to be filed anywhere in the nation in connection with the publication of a
libelous article. Id. at 14-15. Roosevelt's lawsuit was a clear attempt to evade New York
law and to create a chilling effect through the threat of multiple prosecutions.
178. The dangers of presidential abuse are illustrated by the World officials' allegations
that the postal service had opened and read their mail, that government agents had
stopped World messengers and examined the documents they carried, and that the gov-
ernment had planted spies on the newspaper's staff. D. Seitz, supra note 171, at 373.
Furthermore, if the government's argument had been adopted, a president could order
local federal attorneys to file criminal libel actions in every jurisdiction in which the al-
leged libel had entered federal property, and these actions would be prosecuted at no cost
to the president. A president claiming seditious libel would be in a much better position
than a private victim of libel, and would have an extraordinary advantage over the al-
leged libeler, who would lack the unlimited legal resources that the president enjoyed.
An ordinary citizen who sought to bring multiple libel actions faced three problems.
state statutes limited him to one action, he would have to convince state district attorneys
to prosecute, and he would have to bear the legal costs of any civil actions.
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of jurisdiction, '79 Pulitzer wanted a more authoritative decision.' 8 The
World's editorials goaded the government until the latter appealed its
loss to the Supreme Court,' 8 ' where Pulitzer won a unanimous victory.
The Court ruled that the Assimilative Act did not create a new body of
federal criminal law, but merely made an act committed on federal land
punishable in a federal court on the same grounds and to the same extent
that it would have been punishable if the act had been subject to state
jurisdiction. 82 The Court also said that merely circulating libelous ma-
terial on federal property did not constitute a publication of that material
on federal property, and therefore could not be prosecuted under the As-
similative Act.' 83 The Court held that publication occurred when mater-
ials were printed, so that Pulitzer should be prosecuted only in the state
courts of New York.'84 This meant that Roosevelt's efforts to prosecute
several suits would be barred by New York's single-suit provision."'
That provision also would prevent Roosevelt from relying on an earlier
Supreme Court decision that had said that a separate offense was com-
mitted each time a single letter was deposited with the post office in vio-
lation of postal law,'" 6 a holding that could have been used to justify a
separate lawsuit for each mailed copy of a newspaper containing an alleg-
edly libelous article. The Court thus affirmed the indictment's dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction.
It has been argued that Press Publishing supports a narrow interpreta-
tion of the first amendment, since the Court used a jurisdictional argu-
ment to avoid deciding the merits of seditious libel.'8 7 It also has been
argued that since state law provided adequate means for punishing the
defendants, the Court was hinting that it might uphold the constitution-
ality of a state seditious libel conviction.' But since the lower court had
dismissed the indictment for lack of jurisdiction, jurisdiction was the
only issue before the Court. And in this case, state law provided consid-
erable protection to the press, which is why Roosevelt tried to circum-
vent it by filing in federal court. Furthermore, there is no evidence that
New York recognized seditious libel as a ground for criminal or civil
179. United States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1911) (the lower court
concluded that the indictment was not authorized by the Assimilative Act, and dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction).
180. See J. Barrett, supra note 171, at 248.
181. See id.; W. Swanberg, supra note 171, at 383.
182. Press Publishing, 219 U.S. at 9.
183. Id. at 15.
184. See id.
185. See supra note 177.
186. See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916) (mail fraud); In re Henry.
123 U.S. 372, 374 (1887) (same).
187. See Rabban, supra note 7, at 540. But see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,
289-90 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (interpreting Press Publishing as a repudiation or
the Sedition Act).
188. Rabban, supra note 7, at 540.
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action. 8 9 Finally, if one reads the Court's opinion as inviting Roosevelt
to proceed in New York state courts, it is difficult to explain why he did
not accept that invitation, especially since the World had no factual evi-
dence to support the allegations in its articles.o
More important, the Court's jurisdictional arguments exempted libel
from the scope of the Assimilative Act. The Court earlier had held that
depositing obscene material in a post office for mailing was a federal
crime,' 9 ' but in Press Publishing it rejected the government's attempt to
analogize that earlier ruling to a publisher who deposits allegedly libelous
material in a post office for mailing. 92 The Court's decision did nothing
to defend the president from those who had attacked his use of seditious
libel. The World correctly predicted that the Court's opinion would de-
ter any president from repeating Roosevelt's attempt to revive seditious
libel,'93 and a neutral law journal declared that because the decision
would insure that seditious libel never would be revived, the decision
would be "a landmark, one of the substantial guarantees of the continued
freedom of the press."' 94
III. GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF METHODS OF COMMUNICATION
A. The Mails
The postal system was vital to freedom of speech and of the press dur-
ing the nineteenth century. The Constitution recognized the importance
of the postal service and authorized Congress to establish postal offices
and roads.' 95 Well into the nineteenth century, most newspaper editors
received out-of-town news by exchanging newspapers with each other. "'
This practice was so important that the Postal Act of 1792 allowed this
exchange via the mails free of charge. 97 In 1794, newspapers constituted
seventy percent of all mail, 98 and reduced postage rates helped increase
the number of periodicals from less than one hundred in 1825 to more
than six hundred in 1850. 9 Although the invention of the telegraph in
1842 and the development of road and rail networks after 1830 signifi-
cantly improved methods of communication,200 throughout the nine-
189. Rabban cites no evidence, and an examination of the American Digests from 1658
to 1906 does not reveal any seditious libel actions in New York after the case of People ..
Coswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N.Y. 1804).
190. When Pulitzer asked his editors what proof they had of their charges, the World's
highest ranking editor answered "None at all." J. Barrett, supra note 171, at 233; W.
Swanberg, supra note 171, at 367.
191. See Price v. United States, 165 U.S. 311 (1897).
192. United States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U.S. 1, 15 (1911).
193. See New York World (Jan. 4, 1911), quoted in W. Bleyer, supra note 171. at 348.
194. The Panama Libel Case, supra note 175, at 48.
195. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
196. W. Fuller, The American Mail 112 (1972).
197. Act. of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 21, 1 Stat. 232, 238.
198. See W. Fuller, supra note 196, at 117.
199. Id. at 123.
200. Id. at 158-78.
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teenth century the mails were the primary method of distributing
ideas.2 °1
Because the mails were a means of communication owned by the gov-
ernment, tension existed between the first amendment and congressional
authority to operate the postal service. Early statutes produced no first
amendment litigation because they did not regulate the content of mailed
material. But competition from private mail carriers caused Congress to
forbid private citizens from carrying messages on postal roads,20 2 trans-
forming the post office into a monopoly. This development made it even
more crucial to determine whether the government had to accept for
mailing, and thus aid in disseminating, ideas it found offensive or danger-
ous. The problem became apparent before the Civil War, when
Southerners tried to convince Congress to bar abolitionist literature from
the mails.203 Their efforts, although notably unsuccessful in Congress,2°
persuaded the post office to follow state laws in the South that barred
delivery of abolitionist literature.20 5 The post office regulations, however,
produced no reported decisions.
After the Civil War, litigation began in response to statutes that pro-
hibited the use of the mails to certain non-political material, such as ob-
scene photographs and lottery advertisements. The Supreme Court's
early decisions recognized Congress's right to impose such regulations
but tried to protect political material. In the late 1890's, however, the
Court began to defer to the postmaster general's decisions as to which
periodicals qualified for favorable rates. This deference culminated in the
postmaster general's blatant content-based regulation of the mails during
World War I.
1. General Matters
The Supreme Court first seriously considered congressional power
over the mails in Exparte Jackson,2"6 in which it upheld the constitution-
201. See id. at 146-47.
202. See id. at 148-65 (discussing competition between the post office and privately
owned methods of communication). See Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 14, 1 Stat. 232,
236; Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 64, § 19, 4 Stat. 102, 107; Act of Mar. 2, 1827, ch. 61, § 3, 4
Stat. 238, 238; Act of July 2, 1836, ch. 270, § 42, 5 Stat. 80, 89: Act of July 7, 1838, ch.
172, § 2, 5 Stat. 271, 283.
203. See Address by President Jackson to Congress (Dec. 7, 1835), reprinted in 3
Messages And Papers Of The Presidents 175-76 (J. Richardson ed. 1896); see also Letter
from Postmaster General Amos Kendall to postmaster at Charleston, South Carolina
(Aug. 4, 1835), 48 Niles' Register 448 (1835), reprinted in H. Nelson, supra note 4, at
212-13; H. Hyman, supra note 35, 13-14; R. Nye, supra note 21, 41-85.
204. Congress made it a crime for any postmaster to unlawfully detain any mail. Act
of July 2, 1836, ch. 270, § 32, 5 Stat. 80, 87.
205. See Letter from Postmaster General J. Holt to Charles Orton (Dec. 5, 1859).
reprinted in 26 Cong. Rec. 4 (1894) and in H. Nelson, supra note 4, at 218-20.
206. 96 U.S. 727 (1877). The Court earlier had issued three minor decisions concern-
ing the mails. See United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1868) (criminal prosecu-
tion against sheriff for obstructing the mail by arresting carrier for murder); Teal v.
Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284 (1851) (suit to recover value of undelivered mail); United
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ality of a statute that prohibited the use of the mails to promote or con-
duct lotteries.20 7 Justice Field said that, because the Constitution gave
Congress complete control of the postal system,20 8 Congress did not have
to furnish "facilities for the distribution of matter deemed injurious to
the public morals."20 9 This broad statement endangered first amendment
values. If one believed that criticism of Congress or the President injured
public morals-a belief reflected in the Sedition Act of 1798-then Jus-
tice Field's comment could be read as authorizing the postal system to
refuse to carry letters and newspapers that attacked the government. But,
in context, the opinion does not support that interpretation. Justice
Field's statement concerned statutes that regulated lotteries2 l'-the
prevalence and ill-effects of which were a major concern of the times2 "
schemes to obtain money by false pretenses, -1 - and obscenity.2 1' Nothing
in those statutes dealt with political material, and there is no reason to
believe that Justice Field's statement intended to address freedom of the
press issues. Indeed, his discussion of freedom of the press occurred in a
different section of the opinion. 4
While Justice Field recognized congressional power over the mails, he
placed limits on this power. He wrote that letters and sealed packages in
the mail were still protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, so
that a person's right to privacy was extended from his house to material
that he had deliberately placed in the hands of government.2' 5 This rule,
although based on the fourth amendment, had important consequences
for the first amendment. Without its protection, a political dissident had
no assurance that government agents would not open and examine his
mail without a warrant.21 6
States v. Bromley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 87 (1851) (criminal prosecution for violating postal
monopoly).
207. Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736-37 (1877) (upholding Act of July 23, 1868, ch.
246, § 13, 15 Stat. 194, 196).
208. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877).
209. Id. at 736.
210. Id.
211. See Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 167, 172-73 (1850).
212. See Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393 § 5480, 25 Stat. 873. Many schemers advertised
"green goods" for sale, but when the greedy customer sent in legal tender, the schemer
often would not send even the advertised counterfeit bills. If the exchange was arranged
by mail but consummated in person, the recipient usually received a box full of sawsdust
or slips of paper.
213. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736.
214. See infra notes 216-22 and accompanying text.
215. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
216. Government intrusion into sealed mail was a long standing practice by other go%-
emments. Charles II hired employees who were experts at opening and resealing mail,
see W. Fuller, supra note 196, at 7, and letters in early America were opened so often by
postmasters and carriers that important messages were sent in code. Id. at 38. Dunng
the Taft Administration, Sen. Robert La Follete of Wisconsin charged that the post office
had opened mail sent to him by disgruntled postal employees. G. Cullinan, The Post
Office Department 124 (1968).
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Another rule was needed to protect newspaper editors, whose products
could not be sealed. Justice Field warned:
Nor can any regulations be enforced against the transportation of
printed matter in the mail, which is open to examination, so as to inter-
fere in any manner with the freedom of the press. Liberty of circulating
is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without
the circulation, the publication would be of little value. 217
This seemed to say that the federal government had to open its mails to
all newspapers, even those criticizing it.
But Field's language was confusing. Having just recognized the im-
portance of unrestricted circulation, he said that "[i]f, therefore, printed
matter be excluded from the mails, its transportation in any other way
cannot be forbidden by Congress."' 2 8 In one sentence he appeared to
protect the press from censorship; in the very next sentence he appeared
to say Congress could prohibit its critics from using the mails.
This apparent inconsistency can be understood only in the context of
the early nineteenth century, when individuals had private letters deliv-
ered by travelers or concealed messages in periodicals to avoid high pos-
tal rates."1 9 This competition created severe financial problems for the
post office, prompting Congress to require all mail to go through the
federal postal system and ban any other transportation of letters, newspa-
pers, and other material on postal routes.22 If this authority was cou-
pled with congressional power to establish postal routes on any highway,
waterway or railway, Congress could require all political literature dis-
tributed through a given route to go through the mails and then bar the
postal service from delivering it.22 ' Not only did Justice Field recognize
the dilemma, he produced an intriguingly effective solution. Congress
could exclude matter from the mails only if it permitted that material to
be transported by other means,2 2 a move that would reinstitute the same
kind of private competition that earlier had undercut the federal post
office.22 3 Unfortunately, Justice Field's idea was doomed by technology.
In 1850, the post office's services were so rudimentary that private indi-
viduals could-and often did-effectively supplant these services by car-
rying a few private letters and newspapers for distribution in the course
217. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
218. Id. The paragraph was subsequently cited both to support and oppose post office
censorship. Compare United States ex rel. Milwaukee Democratic Publishing Co. v.
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 411 (1921) (opinion of the Court) with id. at 431 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
219. See W. Fuller, supra note 196, at 61-63.
220. See supra note 202; see also Priest, The History of the Postal Monopoly in the
United States, 18 J. L. & Econ. 33, 58-68 (1975) (discussing financial problems of the post
office due to competition).
221. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1877).
222. Id. at 735.
223. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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of their travels. 224 But the post office's development of free home deliv-
ery in urban and rural areas and vastly improved transit schedules, 25
required an infrastructure that a few individuals could not replace.
The next case to address the power of Congress over the mails was In
re Rapier in 1892.26 Two defendants were indicted for mailing a newspa-
per containing an advertisement of a lottery, in violation of the Anti-
Lottery Act.2 27 They petitioned the Court for writs of habeas corpus,
arguing that the statute was unconstitutional. -22 1
The arguments of counsel in Rapier confirm the implicit distinction in
Ex parte Jackson between lotteries, which the Court said could be
banned because they were always criminal, and speech, which was pro-
tected. The defendant tried to show that Jackson was wrong and that
lotteries were not criminal per se, but instead belonged in the fuzzy area
between crime and protected speech.22' 9 The defendant sought to blur
the distinction even further by pointing out that prohibiting the adver-
tisement of lotteries was like banning a book that might be said to pro-
mote murder.2 30  The government's response was Jackson's point:
lotteries could be banned because they were inherently criminal.2 3' The
government also argued that the Supreme Court was a sufficient safe-
guard if Congress tried to regulate anything but lotteries. 23-
Chief Justice Fuller's opinion relied heavily upon Jackson, but added
disturbing dictum. Although he quoted extensively from the Jackson
Court's proclamation that restrictions on lotteries merely protected the
public from immoral material, Chief Justice Fuller said that the mails
could not be required to tolerate every purpose, 33 and that the govern-
ment could not be required to distribute "printed matter which it regards
as injurious to the people."213 4 Unlike the Court in Jackson, he failed to
224. See W. Fuller, supra note 196, at 61-63; see also Priest, supra note 220, at 58-61
(discussing competition from private messengers in the early 19th century).
225. The Post Office began free home delivery in major cities in 1863 and expanded the
service to 2000 cities by 1919. W. Fuller, supra note 196, at 71-74. Rural free delivery
was started on a limited basis in 1896. Id. at 76.
226. 143 U.S. 110 (1892). The opinion was written under somewhat unusual circum-
stances. Justice Bradley, who originally had been assigned to write the opinion, had died.
Chief Justice Fuller noted that as a result the Court would "waive any elaboration of our
views, and confine ourselves to the expression of the general grounds on which our deci-
sion proceeds." Id. at 133. In addition, Justice Field, the author of the Jackson opinion,
was probably senile at this point. See W. King, Melville Weston Fuller 222-24 (1967)
(Justice Gray noted Justice Field's senility in 1892, and by 1893, Field was assigned to
write only nine opinions, instead of his usual twenty-five or thirty. He resigned in the
spring of 1897.).
227. In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 111 & n.l (1892) (citing Act of September 19, 1890,
ch. 908, 26 Stat. 465).
228. In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 120-26 (1892) (argument for petitioner).
229. 143 U.S. at 119, 124-25 (argument for petitioner).
230. Id. at 125.
231. Id. at 129 (argument for respondent).
232. Id. at 131.
233. Id. at 134.
234. Id.
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limit this holding to lotteries and other criminal activities, implying that
the government could regulate other types of content.
The next decision, American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAn-
nulty,235 is startlingly modem. After a hearing, the Postmaster General
had stopped all mail addressed to a school of "magnetic healing," on the
grounds that its owners were using the mails to obtain money by false
pretenses.236 The School's owners contended that their operation was
legitimate and that they had been deprived of property without due pro-
cess of law because they had not received a judicial hearing before the
Postmaster General stopped delivery of their mail. 2 7 Although these
arguments were couched in terms of the fourth and fifth amendments,
they had strong first amendment overtones. If due process did not re-
quire a court hearing before the postmaster halted mail delivery, the
postmaster would be relatively free to deny the use of the mails to people
and institutions with whose political views he disagreed. By a seven-to-
two vote, the Court held that the Postmaster General was not authorized
to stop the publication of opinions that he considered to be false.238
Writing for the majority, Justice Peckham said that the school's sale of
information about magnetic healing, a process that claimed to heal a va-
riety of ills by large doses of magnetism, was not fraudulent because the
effectiveness of treatment was a matter of opinion.2 9 He observed that
"[e]ven intelligent people may and indeed do differ among themselves '24 °
as to the treatment's efficacy, so that there was "no exact standard of
absolute truth by which to prove the assertion false and a fraud,' 241 ' and
the question could not be "reduced to one of fact as distinguished from
mere opinion." '242 Justice Peckham also set forth limits to government
regulation of the mail. Instead of citing Jackson and Rapier to show that
the government completely controlled the mails, Justice Peckham merely
conceded that point "for the purpose of this case."'243 He stressed that
because the School's activities could not be considered fraudulent, the
Postmaster's actions exceeded the jurisdiction given by Congress.244
Earlier postmasters had ignored federal statutes on occasion, 245 but Jus-
tice Peckham declared that a postmaster could not refuse to deliver mail
unless authorized by Congress.246
Justice Peckham went one step further in limiting the postmaster's
235. 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
236. Id. at 96-98.
237. Id. at 101-02.
238. Id. at 106.
239. Id. at 104-06.
240. Id. at 104.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 106.
243. Id. at 107.
244. Id. at 105-06.
245. See supra notes 202-205 and accompanying text.
246. American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 109 (1902).
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power. Again conceding for the sake of argument that the postmaster's
factual determinations concerning violation of statutes were conclusive,
he further explained that if on the facts there was no violation of a federal
law, the Postmaster's determination would "not be the determination of
a question of fact, but a pure mistake of law.",247 Now that the issue was
one of law, not fact, the lower courts would have to pay less deference to
the Postmaster General's decisions and could better serve as a shield
against improper executive action.
Magnetic Healing was a complete victory for freedom of speech. The
Court protected a questionable philosophy; it limited the power of the
bureaucracy to infringe upon personal liberties; it reinforced Jackson's
distinction between criminal activity and speech; and it required an exact
standard of absolute truth before speech can be determined to be a fraud.
This recognition that opinion was not a grounds for criminal prosecution
would have protected many individuals prosecuted under the Sedition
Act of 1798 or the Espionage Act of 1917. But the spirit of Magnetic
Healing soon fell ill, and reappeared later only in dissents. 248
Three cases decided in 1904 signaled a change in the Court's attitude
toward the use of the mails. In Houghton v. Payne 249 a large publishing
house sought to have its material declared eligible for second-class mail
rates as a periodical. Houghton wanted to receive the special mail rates
by publishing the works of an author in series form and numbering each
edition consecutively. ° The Postmaster General rejected this novel idea
and said that the publications were books, which went at the higher
third-class rate.25 Writing for the Court, Justice Brown described the
question as purely ministerial.252 He did not discuss any particular polit-
ical or ideological position that the books might have taken; he simply
and briefly upheld the Postmaster's decision.
Two justices disagreed strongly. Justice Harlan, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Fuller, argued that such publications had been treated as periodicals
for many years.2 53 Harlan extensively quoted legislative history that
showed that the special second-class rate was intended to encourage the
spread of inexpensive editions of literature among the masses. 2 ' Finally,
Justice Harlan repeated Magnetic Healing's attack on the power of the
Postmaster General.255
247. Id.
248. See, e.g., Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 266-67 (1919) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting); United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407, 427 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
249. 194 U.S. 88 (1904).
250. Id. at 95-96.
251. Id. at 98.
252. Id. at 99 (government merely revoked publication's classification as second class
mail).
253. Id. at 102 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
254. Id at 101 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
255. See id. at 103 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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The disagreement within the Court continued in a companion case,
Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne.2 56 The publisher claimed that its consecu-
tively numbered publication that featured the sheet music of a different
composer each month was entitled to second-class status; the Postmaster
General disagreed. Justice Brown easily disposed of the publisher's con-
tention on the same grounds he used in Houghton,2" and increased the
deference accorded the Postmaster General.258 The Court thus discarded
the protection established in Magnetic Healing that the Postmaster could
only decide questions of fact and that the Court would overturn convic-
tions if the facts determined by the Postmaster did not show a viola-
tion.259 Justice Brown's majority opinion gave the bureaucracy the
power to decide both questions of fact and law and clothed the bureau-
cracy with a strong presumption of correctness. Again, Justice Harlan
and Chief Justice Fuller dissented for substantially the same reasons as
they had in Houghton.26°
But the dangerous implications of Bates did not go unnoticed. When
Justice Brown continued down the same path in Public Clearing House v.
Coyne,26' a short time later, his opinion received only four other votes.
This decreased support was surprising because the facts in the case
obviously favored Brown's position. The defendants were running a
pyramiding scheme.262 The postmaster seized the defendants' mail,
stamped it as fraudulent, and returned it under a statute that authorized
him to block the use of the mails to obtain money by false pretenses.263
But Justice Brown went beyond the obvious decision to include some
distressing dicta that split the Court's opinion despite the clear cut nature
of the crime. 2 4 Twenty-seven years after Ex parte Jackson, during
256. 194 U.S. 106 (1904).
257. Id. at 107.
258. Justice Brown's opinion for the majority noted that:
where the decision of questions of fact is committed by Congress to the judg-
ment and discretion of the head of a department, his decision thereon is conclu-
sive; and that even upon mixed questions of law and fact, or of law alone, his
action will carry with it a strong presumption of its correctness, and the courts
will not ordinarily review it, although they may have the power, and will occa-
sionally exercise the right of so doing.
Id. at 109-10.
259. See American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 109
(1902).
260. See Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 110 (1904).
261. 194 U.S. 497 (1904).
262. Id. at 500. The scheme was a fairly blatant fraud. The defendants had collected
$137,390.66, taken $36,000 as "salaries," distributed less than $170 apiece to between
600-700 investors, and left over 10,000 other investors with nothing. Id.
263. Id. at 498; see Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 908, § 2, 26 Stat. 465, 466; Act of March
2, 1895, ch. 191, 28 Stat. 963.
264. Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904). Justice Peckham, the au-
thor of Magnetic Healing, dissented without an opinion. 194 U.S. at 516. Justices
Brewer, White, and Holmes also were distressed enough to concur without opinion. 194
U.S. at 516. One suspects they agreed that fraud was present but opposed Brown's dicta.
Curiously, Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Harlan did not dissent, but their majority
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which time the postal service had expanded its services extensively, 265
Justice Brown argued that mail service was still not an indispensable part
of a civil government because messages had been carried by private indi-
viduals for thousands of years.266 Because of this, he said, the govern-
ment did not have to provide postal service and could attach any
conditions to the use of the service that it chose. 267 Next, Justice Brown
contended that since the courts could oversee the decisions of the post-
master general-an oversight power that he had just weakened in
Bates 268 -Congress could safely entrust the postmaster to seize letters
whenever the postmaster determined that there was sufficient evidence
that the contents of those letters violated the law.269 Finally, Brown's
opinion in Public Clearing House undermined Jackson's declaration that
the postmaster could not open sealed letters and packages;27 0 Brown as-
serted that because this would prevent the postmaster from determining
which packages contained unmailable material, the postmaster could
simply refuse to transmit all mail addressed to the defendants. 21'
The Court's final mail decision during this period, Lewis Publishing
Co. v. Morgan,72 was a sheep in wolf's clothing for the press. The news-
paper lost its case but the press as a whole gained Supreme Court ap-
proval of its mail subsidy and the seeds of modern content-neutrality
doctrine. The Court approved a post office requirement that each news-
paper using second-class mailing rates clearly label all advertisements
that might be mistaken for news or editorial matter and identify the
newspaper's publishers, editors, owners, and major investors.- " The
newspaper argued that the required disclosure of business information
violated the first and fourteenth amendments 274 -an argument that has
some validity.2 75 The newspaper probably protested because revealing
votes must be considered to be less than solid in light of their dissenting opinions in
Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88, 101 (1904) and Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S.
106, 110 (1904).
265. The postal service had almost completed its extension of free urban delivery by
1900; free rural delivery was instituted in 1897. See W. Fuller, supra note 196, at 71-76.
Congress had also, in 1885, provided extremely cheap mailing rates for periodicals.
Thus, while the argument that Congress did not have to provide mail service was weak in
1877, when Exparte Jackson was decided, it was completely unrealistic in 1904.
266. See Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 506 (1904).
267. Id.
268. See Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1904).
269. See Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 509-10 (1904).
270. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1877).
271. See Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 510 (1904).
272. 229 U.S. 288 (1912).
273. Id. at 315.
274. Id. at 298-99 (argument for petitioners).
275. The English and American seditious libel prosecutions of the late 1700's would
have been more successful if printers were required to publicly disclose their identities.
Many important pieces of American political literature were published anonymously, or
under pseudonyms such as "Brutus," "Cato," the "Federal Farmer," and "Centinel."
See, e.g., The Federalist; The Complete Anti-Federalist (H. Storing ed. 1981) (7 volume
collection of writings by opponents of the Constitution). There were, however, many
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the names of the men who controlled a newspaper would have seriously
undermined the newspaper's credibility.
276
The most important part of Chief Justice White's opinion in Lewis
Publishing.77 is easily overlooked. At that time, the second-class rate
was one-eightieth of the rate for letters, so that while the post office made
$70 million a year moving letters, it lost the same amount moving news-
papers.278 This was a substantial subsidy for the dissemination of infor-
mation, and Chief Justice White sustained that subsidy.
Chief Justice White's second theme was a repetition of earlier case law
on Congress' power to regulate the mails. Recognizing that this power
could be used for impermissible purposes, White said that the Court
would judge the validity of postal regulations by their intent.27 9 He
noted that these regulations did not affect the content of the newspa-
pers, 28 implying that content-neutrality was essential, and held that the
main purpose of the regulation was to prevent any abuse of the special
rates.28' Having found that Congress did not intend to curtail press free-
doms, White observed that the press was to be protected and subsidized,
not for its own sake, but for the sake of the public.282
demands for a bar on anonymous publications. See Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1
Dali.) 319, 325 (Pa. 1788); B. Franklin, An Account Of The Supreme Court Of Judica-
ture in Pennsylvania, viz., The Court of The Press (1789), reprinted in 5 The Founders'
Constitution, supra note 2, at 130. Charles I's licensing act had required all books to
identify their authors and printers. An Act For Preventing The Frequent Abuses In
Printing Seditious Treasonable And Unlicensed Books (1662), 14 Chas. 2, ch. 33, re-
printed in 5 The Founders' Constitution, supra note 2, at 112. But newspapers had radi-
cally changed since then: a newspaper was now a major business enterprise in which
anonymity had little value. For example the New York Herald had been started in 1835
with only $500 capital. In 1883, just fifty years later, Joseph Pulitzer paid $346,000 for
the almost bankrupt New York World. See E. Emery & M. Emery, supra note 21, at 143,
256. Newspaper printing presses and staffs made operations immobile and conspicuous,
and even if the authors remained anonymous, processes for libel, etc., could be served on
their publishers' offices just as easily as advertisers could contact the newspaper.
276. United States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U.S. 1 (1911), furnishes an interesting
example. The World's initial report of President Roosevelt's involvement in a scandal
was relatively innocuous, but a month later-the day before the Presidential election of
1908-the Indianapolis News printed a much stronger version of the article, drawing
Roosevelt's wrath upon itself and the World. Unbeknowst to the public, the News was
owned by Vice-President Charles Fairbanks, whom Roosevelt had ignored by endorsing
William Howard Taft for President. See D. Seitz, supra note 171, at 354.
277. 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
278. Id. at 303-04.
279. Id. at 308-09.
280. Id. at 316.
281. Id.
282. Chief Justice White quoted:
The extremely low postage rate accorded to second-class matter gives these
publications a circulation and a corresponding influence unequaled in history.
It is a common belief that many periodicals are secretly owned or controlled,
and that in reading such papers the public is deceived through ignorance of the
interests the publication represents. We believe that, since the general public
bears a large portion of the expense of distribution of second-class matter, and
since these publications wield a large influence because of their special conces-
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In retrospect, the Court's decisions in this area were inconsistent, and
that inconsistency had important consequences for government control
of the mails during World War I. The pre-war decisions protected lib-
erty of circulation, tolerated an unpopular and questionable opinion, and
restricted the Postmaster General's power to exclude material from the
mails because of its political content. The later cases, however, removed
those restrictions without explanation or analysis. The onslaught of the
World War and the passage of the Espionage Act 28 3 exacerbated this
change.2 84
2. Obscenity
Although the Supreme Court frequently considered convictions under
federal statutes that barred obscene materials from the mails, it never
confronted the two crucial issues presented by obscenity. Its opinions
neither reconciled those statutes with the first amendment nor defined
obscenity. Instead, the Court focused on issues only indirectly related to
the first amendment-issues that today seem trivial.285
sions in the mails, it is not only equitable but highly desirable that the public
should know the individuals who own or control them.
Id. at 312 (quoting the report of the House Committee that had approved the bill).
283. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217; amended by Act of May 16, 1918, ch.
75, § 1, 40 Stat. 553.
284. See United States ex reL Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v.
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921).
The Court upheld the right of the postmaster general to revoke the second-class mail-
ing privileges of a socialist newspaper that had opposed the war. Id. at 408-09, 414-15.
The clash between the majority opinion by Justice Clarke and the dissent by Justices
Holmes and Brandeis reflected the inconsistencies of the Court's earlier mail decisions.
Justice Clarke cited Jackson, Public Clearing House and Lewis Publishing to show that
congressional power over the mails was "practically plenary." Id. at 418. He further
noted the Court's decisions granting deference to the postmaster's decisions. Id. at 409,
413.
Justice Brandeis argued that the first amendment limited Congress' power over the
mails, and reiterated Jackson's language concerning the importance of liberty of circula-
tion. Id. at 430-31 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis also cited Magnetic Healing and
Lewis Publishing to rebut the majority's broad deference to the postmaster's discretionary
authority. Id. at 427, 431-32 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Justice Holmes joined the dissent of Justice Brandeis, id. at 436, and also issued a short
dissent of his own. His dissent, unsupported by authority, flatly declared that the post-
master had claimed "practically despotic power," id. at 437, and that, by making the
circulation of a newspaper impossible, constituted "a serious attack upon liberties that
not even the war induced Congress to infringe." Id. at 438 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Thirteen months after the armistice, Burleson still kept the New York Call and the
Milwaukee Leader from the mails because of their earlier opposition to the war. Z.
Chafee, supra note 13, 104. One contemporary legal scholar complained that the Post
Office could censor the press and the mails more thoroughly than the Russian govern-
ment could. Byrd, The Decay of Personal Rights and Guarantees, 18 Yale L.J. 252, 254
(1908).
285. A brief history of obscenity regulation in England and the United States is related
in the Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 348-542 (1970) [herein-
after Comm'n Report]. The report contends that obscenity per se was not regulated until
about 1850; instead only obscene material that also attacked religious institutions was
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Congress first regulated obscenity in 1842, when it barred the importa-
tion of obscene pictures and drawings.286 An 1865 statute barred books
and pictures of obscene or indecent character from the mails but did not
mention letters;287 an 1872 statute added letters Ntith envelopes that dis-
played "scurrilous epithets. ' 28" The creation, possession or sale of ob-
scene materials in a territory within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal government was not barred until 1873 in the Comstock Act.28 9
The Supreme Court first discussed obscenity in 1877. InEx parte Jack-
son 290 the Court cited federal obscenity statutes in support of its ruling
that the exclusion of lottery materials from the mails did not interfere
with the freedom of the press but only prevented the use of government
facilities for the distribution of "matter deemed injurious to the public
morals."29' After that brief dictum, the Court did not address obscenity
again until 1890.292 Between 1895 and 1897, however, the Court issued
six opinions on obscenity, 293 and briefly mentioned the subject in another
decision.294 The Court did not issue another opinion on obscenity until
1913.295 This sudden burst of cases was unusual, 296 and the three major
prohibited by English and state statutes. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957),
Justice Brennan, in his majority opinion, said that obscenity per se was regulated by the
states at the time of the Constitution's adoption, even in states with constitutions guaran-
teeing freedom of expression. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 481-83. But he supported this by
noting that thirteen of the first fourteen states made "blasphemy or profanity" a crime,
id. at 482, and he conceded that "profanity and obscenity were related offenses." Id. at
483.
286. Act of Aug. 30, 1842, ch. 270, § 28, 5 Stat. 548, 566-67. The statute said nothing
about non-pictorial obscenity, apparently leaving that area unregulated.
287. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 89, § 16, 13 Stat. 504, 507. Violations were punishable
by a $500 fine, one year's imprisonment, or both.
288. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 148, 17 Stat. 283, 302. The statute did not alter
the penalties for such violations.
289. Comstock Act, ch. 258, § 1, 17 Stat. 598 (1873), amended by Act of July 12, 1876,
ch. 186, § 1, 19 Stat. 90 (adding jurisdictional limitation). The jurisdictional limitation
was included to prevent regulation of intrastate commerce. Cf Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942) (federal wheat quota upheld under Commerce Clause, despite extension
of federal regulation to production wholly for consumption on farm, because these intra-
state activities so affect interstate commerce).
290. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
291. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 736.
292. United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255 (1890).
293. See Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486 (1897); Price v. United States, 165 U.S.
311 (1897); Andrews v. United States, 162 U.S. 420 (1896); Swearingen v. United States,
161 U.S. 446 (1896); Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896); Grimm v. United States,
156 U.S. 604 (1895).
294. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) (regulation of obscenity per-
missible as one of several exceptions to the first amendment).
295. See Bartell v. United States, 227 U.S. 427 (1913).
296. The reason for this flurry of activity between 1895 and 1897 is not clear. The
Comstock Act was over twenty years old by that time, and Comstock's efforts had been
in full swing for over a decade. See A. Comstock, Traps for the Young (1884), reprinted
in part in H. Nelson, supra note 4, at 269, 276-77 (claiming 700 arrests before 1883 result-
ing from work of New York Society for the Suppression of Vice); Comm 'it Report, supra
note 285, at 353 (Comstock made special agent of the Post Office, where he vigorously
sought out obscene publications). The explosion of federal cases contrasts with the grad-
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issues discussed in the opinions seem unimportant compared to the unad-
dressed issues of defining obscenity and reconciling the regulations with
the first amendment.
The first question addressed was whether an indictment for obscenity
must include an actual copy of the allegedly obscene material. Several
defendants complained of indictments in which grand juries had said that
the material was too indecent to appear upon the records of the court.
29 7
The exclusion from the record caused problems for defendants for two
reasons. First, as the Court conceded in Bartell, the omission of the ob-
scene material created a double jeopardy problem. When a convicted
defendant was later charged with distributing obscene material, it was
difficult to tell if both charges concerned the same material.298 The
Court said this problem could be solved through parol evidence at the
second trial as to the subject matter of the first trial.2"99 The second prob-
lem became apparent when an indictment referred only to a particular
edition of a newspaper, and the defendant had to wait until trial to dis-
cover which part of the newspaper was the subject of dispute."° The
Court held that the trial court, in its discretion, could include the mate-
rial in the court records, and that where this was not done, introduction
of the material at trial gave the defendants sufficient notice °.30  Given the
lack of any federal rules governing criminal procedure at the time, any
effect this procedure may have had on the jury is unclear. If the jury
learned that the judge had declined to include the allegedly obscene ma-
terial in the indictment, it might conclude that the judge already had
decided that the material was obscene.- -
ual increase of prosecutions in the state court. The digests reveal five reported state cases
dealing with obscene publications (as opposed to indecent exposure or profanity) before
1870, four during the next decade, nine during the 1880s, and fourteen between 1890 and
1900. See 37 Am. Dig. 1757-66 (century ed. 1902) (collecting cases on obscenity from
1658-1896); 15 Am. Dig. 670-73 (first decennial ed. 1906) (collecting cases from 1897-
1906).
297. See Bartell v. United States, 227 U.S. 427, 431-33 (1913); Dunlop v. United
States, 165 U.S. 486, 490-91 (1897); Price v. United States, 165 U.S. 311, 314 (1897);
Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 33-35 (1896); Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604,
608-09 (1895).
298. See Bartell, 227 U.S. at 431.
299. See id. at 433.
300. Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 490-91 (1897).
301. Bartell v. United States, 227 U.S. 427, 432-34 (1913); Dunlop v. United States,
165 U.S. 486, 491 (1897); Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 34-35 (1896). Justices
White and Shiras dissented in Rosen for this reason, asking if it would be sufficient to
allege the publication of obscene material in a twenty-volume encyclopedia without iden-
tifying the page or describing the specific material in issue. Rosen, 161 U.S. at 47-48
(White, J., dissenting).
302. The extent to which the material must be described in the indictment still varies
among different jurisdictions. See, e.g., United States v. New Orleans Book Mart. Inc..
328 F. Supp. 136, 146-47 (E.D. La. 1971) (it is sufficient if material lacking in the indict-
ment is later provided by the prosecution); State v. Lavin, 204 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Iowa
1973) (material need not be included or described; defendant can file bill of particulars);
State v. Boyd, 35 Ohio App. 2d 147, 300 N.E.2d 752, 757 (1972) (material need not
appear in indictment; parol evidence may be used to prove double jeopardy claim); State
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A second recurrent issue was the question of entrapment. To enforce
the Comstock Act postal agents placed orders with advertisers of obscene
material.3"3 The Court said this was not entrapment, holding that such
efforts did not induce the commission of a crime but only ascertained if a
defendant was operating an illegal business. °4
The third major issue raised in these cases concerned statutory con-
struction. The federal statutes did not encompass all traffic in obscene
materials, and in two early cases the Court construed those statutes nar-
rowly. In United States v. Chase,3 °5 the defendant mailed an obscene
letter in a wrapper with nothing but the addressee's name and address on
it. Chase was convicted under the 1876 statute, which applied to any
obscene "book, pamphlet, advertisement, circular, paper, writing, print,
picture, drawing or other representation, ' 3 6 but the Court ruled that
none of these categories included letters.30 7 This was not merely an exer-
cise in literalism. Noting that the lower federal judges had said that Con-
gress intended to exclude all obscene material from the mails, the Court
rejected such a "sweeping" policy and said that the statute's purpose was
only to purge the mails of obscene material "as far as was consistent with
the rights reserved to the people, and with a due regard to the security of
private correspondence from examination. "30 The Court's concern for
individual liberties is obvious; and its supporting citation to Jackson
makes the liberal meaning of that decision clear. The Court noted that a
later amendment had added the term "letter" to the statute but specifi-
cally said that it declined to decide if that amendment included such a
"strictly private sealed letter., 309 Such a restrictive statutory interpreta-
v. Simpson, 56 Wis. 2d 27, 32, 201 N.W.2d 558, 561 (1972) (attaching copy of material to
indictment is commendable but not required).
303. See Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 609 (1895); Comm'n Report, supra
note 285, at 353.
304. Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 609 (1895); see also Andrews v. United
States, 162 U.S. 420, 423 (1896) (agents opening mail addressed to imaginary addressee
not entrapment as it did not violate federal laws). These cases formed the basis for the
modern law of entrapment and are still cited. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S.
206, 208-09 (1966); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932); Wager v. Pro, 575
F.2d 882, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
305. 135 U.S. 255 (1890).
306. See Comstock Act, ch. 258, § 1, 17 Stat. 598 (1873), as amended by Act of July
12, 1876, ch. 186, § 1, 19 Stat. 90.
307. Chase, 135 U.S. at 258-60.
308. Id. at 261 (citing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877)).
309. Id. at 262. The Court maintained that attitude in Swearingen v. United States,
161 U.S. 446 (1896), where it held that the Comstock Act was "highly penal" and so
should be narrowly construed. Id. at 45 1. Swearingen was convicted by a lower court of
distributing a newspaper editorial judged obscene because it vilified a certain Populist
politician, using coarse and vulgar language. For instance, the editorial stated that the
politician would " 'pimp and fatten on a sister's shame with as much unction as a buz-
zard gluts in carrion'" and "'would sell a mother's honor with less hesitancy and for
much less silver than Judas betrayed the Savior.'" Id. at 447 n. 1. The majority, despite a
dissent by four Justices, said the language was coarse and vulgar, but not obscene, be-
cause it was not immoral in terms of sexual impurity. Id. at 450-51 (quoting editorial).
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tion would have seriously threatened the Post Office's enforcement of the
obscenity laws, for, if it was adopted in a later decision, distributors of
obscene material could protect themselves from investigation merely by
sending their products in sealed, letter-sized envelopes.
Chase, however, was short-lived. In Andrews v. United States the de-
fendant was convicted under the amended statute of mailing an obscene
letter in a plain wrapper.3 ° Again, the circuit courts had split on
whether that new language included private, sealed letters, but the Court
disposed of the issue with a one-sentence citation to Grimm v. United
States.3"1 The Andrews court said Grimm controlled becauseGrimm had
held that a private sealed letter with a plain wrapper and obscene con-
tents violated the statute.3"' The defendant in Grimm, however, had not
sent obscene materials through the mail; he had been convicted of mail-
ing information on how to obtain obscene material, an entirely different
offense under a different part of the statute.3"' Furthermore, Grimm did
not discuss whether the presence of obscene material in a plain wrapper
violated the statute. By erroneously interpreting Grimm, the Andrews
Court avoided serious discussion of the free speech issues, thereby sur-
reptitiously weakening Jackson's protection of personal privacy.
The Court's discussion of these issues camouflauged its failure to ad-
dress two issues of much greater importance. First, the Court never de-
fined obscenity; American courts therefore looked to England, where
Regina v. Hicklin 3 4 had set forth an extremely restrictive definition.
Hicklin said that a book could be banned if it contained even a few ob-
scene passages, even though the work as a whole had literary merit.3 t 5
Hicklin also said that a work was obscene if it tended to "deprave and
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into
whose hands a publication of this sort may fall," 3 6 thereby defining ob-
scenity in terms of the most susceptible audience that might encounter it.
Lower federal courts tended to follow Hicklin 31 because the Supreme
310. Andrews v. United States, 162 U.S. 420, 423-24 (1896).
311. Andrews, 162 U.S. at 424 (citing Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604 (1895)).
312. Id.
313. Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 607-08 (1895).
314. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
315. Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868).
316. Id.
317. The federal courts made frequent use of Hicklin. See, e.g., United States v. Ken-
nerley, 209 F. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); United States v. Moore, 129 F. 159, 161
(W.D. Mo. 1904); United States v. Smith, 45 F. 476, 477 (E.D. Wis. 1891); United States
v. Harmon, 45 F. 414, 417 (D. Kan. 1891); United States v. Clarke, 38 F. 732, 733 (E.D.
Mo. 1889); United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093, 1104 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No
14,571). Several state courts also used Hicklin. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Allison, 227
Mass. 57, 61, 116 N.E. 265, 266 (Mass. 1917); Halsey v. New York Soc'y for the Supres-
sion of Vice, 234 N.Y. 1, 10, 136 N.E. 219, 222 (1922) (Crane, J., dissenting); People v.
Muller, 96 N.Y. 408, 411, 48 Am. Rep. 635, 637. Other courts said that the meanings of
obscenity and immorality were well-known to the average person and need not be de-
fined. See, e.g., Block v. City of Chicago, 239 II1. 251, 253, 87 N.E. 1011, 1015 (1909);
Commonwealth v. Buckley, 200 Mass. 346, 352, 86 N.E. 910, 911 (1909).
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Court's discussion of the definition issue was sketchy and inconsistent.
In Rosen v. United States,31 the Court said that it was not error for the
judge to let the jury decide whether the material in question was obscene;
thus, the Court impliedly approved of an instruction based on Hicklin .3 9
Only a year later, however, the Court approved, with little discussion, an
instruction that told the jury to use its own conscience to determine
whether the material was calculated to deprave the ordinary reader. 320
On paper, this was much more tolerant than the Hicklin test. Instead of
merely having a tendency to deprave, the material had to be calculated to
deprave, and the effect was to be judged on the ordinary reader, not the
most susceptible reader. The Court, however, never directly acknowl-
edged this inconsistency, nor did it express its reasons for approving
either instruction. 32' As a result, so many courts used the Hicklin test
that in 1913 Learned Hand said he was bound to use it, even though he
criticized it as being more consonant with "mid-Victorian morals" than
with the "understanding and morality of the present time. '32 2
The Court's failure to define obscenity was accentuated by its failure to
explain why the federal government's regulation of obscenity did not vio-
late the first amendment.32 3 Ex parte Jackson provided little support for
its statement that the federal government could bar from the mails mate-
rial that would injure public morals, 324 and later cases simply adopted
that conclusionary declaration as it concerned obscenity. 325 The Court
never examined whether the framers intended to authorize federal regu-
lation of obscenity, nor did it analyze the text of the first amendment.
And while it said in Robertson v. Baldwin (again, with no analysis) that
regulation of obscenity was an exception to the first amendment, 326 it did
not explain why Congress had waited at least fifty years to recognize that
exception.
318. 161 U.S. 29 (1896).
319. Id. at 43.
320. Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 500-01 (1897).
321. See id. The Hicklin test survived for several decades but died in the hands of the
lower federal courts. See United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936); United
States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1934);
United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1930); see also Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 78-93 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussion of Court's fail-
ure to define obscenity and declaration that obscenity cannot be defined).
322. United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (citing United
States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 14,571); United States v.
Smith, 45 F. 476 (E.D. Wis. 1891); United States v. Harmon, 45 F. 414 (D. Kan. 1891);
United States v. Clarke, 38 F. 500 (E.D. Mo. 1889).
323. But see Clark v. United States, 211 F. 916, 918 (8th Cir. 1914) ("freedom of the
press has enough to answer for without making it a protecting shield for the commission
of crime").
324. 96 U.S. 727, 737 (1877) (the Court merely expressed, without citation, that it had
"no doubt" concerning the constitutionality of the Act).
325. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957) (Exparte Jackson and other
early cases "assumed" that obscenity was not protected by the first amendment).
326. 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
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As a result, when Justice Brennan wrote on the constitutionality of
criminal obscenity statutes in Roth v. United States, in 195737 the slate
on which he wrote truly was clean.
B. Government Employees
The spoils system of the nineteenth century gave incumbent politicians
a new means of retaining office and abridging the free speech rights of
government employees. Many government positions were patronage
jobs, and employees were expected or required to donate time and money
to the campaigns of their superiors.328 This prevented employees from
exercising their rights to speak for candidates of their choice; even worse,
it forced some to speak for candidates whom they did not support3 29
Taxpayers also were affected. Some government salaries were increased
so that employees could "kick back" their raises to the campaign chests
of the politicians who controlled their jobs,33 which meant that tax dol-
lars were used to support politicians and political parties.
These abuses, combined with revelations of corruption involving Presi-
dent Grant's private secretary, Secretary of War Belknap, and Vice-Pres-
ident Colfax,33" ' created considerable pressure for reform. President
Grant made only half-hearted efforts to solve the problem,332 but in
1876, Congress made it a misdemeanor for a federal employee to request
of, give to, or receive from a fellow employee any campaign contribu-
tions.333 Pressure for further reform revived in 1881, when a man who
unsuccessfully had sought a federal position assassinated President Gar-
field, 334 and Congress began work on what was to become the Pendleton
Civil Service Act.335
It was in that climate that the Supreme Court considered Ex parte
Curtis,33 6 which tested the constitutionality of the 1876 measure. Both
Chief Justice Waite's majority opinion upholding the statute and the dis-
327. 354 U.S. at 476 (1957).
328. See 14 Cong. Rec. 294-96 (1882) (statement of Sen. Pendleton); 14 Cong. Rec.
319 (1882) (statement of Sen. George); D. Rosenbloom, Federal Service And The Consti-
tution 59, 62-64 (1971).
329. See D. Rosenbloom, supra note 328, at 60-64.
330. See 14 Cong. Rec. 295-96 (1882) (statement of Sen. Pendleton); 14 Cong. Rec.
319 (1882) (statement of Sen. George).
331. See 1 B. Bailyn, D. Davis, D. Donald, J. Thomas, R. Wiebe, G. Wood, The Great
Republic 804-06 (1940) [hereinafter Bailyn & Davis]; 1 S. Morison, H. Commanfer, & W.
Leuchtenburg, The Growth Of The American Republic 778-80 (1969)[hereinafter S.
Morison].
332. See 2 Bailyn & Davis, supra note 331, at 806; H. Kaplan, The Law of Civil Ser-
vice 8-9 (1958); 1 S. Morison, supra note 331, at 775-76.
333. See Act of August 15, 1876, ch. 287, § 6, 19 Stat. 143, 169.
334. See 1 Bailyn & Davis, supra note 331, at 8072; S. Morison, supra note 331. at 157-
58.
335. Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, § 7, 22 Stat. 403, 406.
336. 106 U.S. 371 (1882).
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sent showed concern for the law's effect on freedom of speech, and the
opinion has served as the basis for modern law.
Chief Justice Waite's opinion had two major premises. First, he
stressed the limited scope of the statute. Noting that the law merely for-
bade federal employees from giving or receiving contributions from other
federal employees, he was quick to point out that the act did not restrict
their political privileges in any other way.33 7 Employees still could con-
tribute to state and local campaigns, provide services to any campaign,
and express their opinions about all candidates. Curiously, Chief Justice
Waite even said that
managers of political campaigns, not in the employ of the United
States, are just as free now to call on those in office for money ... as
ever they were, and those in office can contribute as liberally as they
please, provided their payments are not made to any of the prohibited
officers or employees. 338
Second, he found that the clear goal of the act was to promote integrity
among government workers, 339 and he argued that the law also protected
federal employees, contending that contributions made by a subordinate
to a superior employee were as often caused by pressure from the supe-
rior (and fear of consequent discharge) as they were by a desire to express
the political views of the contributor.340 The Chief Justice held that
these legitimate goals made the statute permissible under the necessary
and proper clause.341
Justice Bradley responded with a vigorous dissent that contained the
seeds of the "least restrictive means" test used in modern first amend-
ment law. 342 Bradley did not contest the legitimacy of the statute's pur-
pose but argued that it could have been achieved by prohibiting only
involuntary contributions. His concern was that the act also barred vol-
untary contributions by employees, thus abridging their freedom of
speech.34 3 Although sound in theory, Bradley's dissent ignored a harsh
reality. If a superior could pressure a subordinate into donating to the
superior's campaign, he or others in his political machine also could pres-
sure the subordinate to testify that the gift was made voluntarily. It was
337. Id. at 371-72.
338. Id. at 373. Justice Waite's comment created a loophole that effectively emascu-
lated the statute. An officeholder could appoint a campaign manager who was not a
federal employee to extort contributions from the officeholder's underlings. As a result,
coerced campaign contributions continued to be commonplace. See D. Rosenbloom,
supra note 329, at 84-85.
339. See Exparte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882).
340. See id. at 374.
341. Id. at 372 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8).
342. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1882) (Bradley, J., dissenting). The least
restrictive means test holds that even when the governmental purpose is legitimate, it
cannot be pursued by means that stifle civil liberties if the goal can be achieved by a
narrower statute. First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
343. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1882) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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not until Congress passed a complete ban on all gifts that subordinates
received fuller protection from abuse by superiors.34
Both opinions in Curtis show sincere concern for the political rights of
federal employees. Speaking only two years later, the Virginia Supreme
Court said that Curtis would have been decided differently if the statute
had barred federal employees from all political privileges. 4 5 Congress
later imposed further limitations on the political rights of federal employ-
ees,346 and the Court upheld these new limits, citing Curtis to show that
their purpose was to promote government integrity, not to silence federal
employees.34 7 Later cases have recognized Bradley's concern that such
statutes infringe on the first amendment rights of employees who want to
contribute, 348 but the Court-including Justice Brennan-has repeatedly
endorsed the Curtis majority's result, on the grounds that such limita-
tions protect the first amendment rights of those employees who do not
want to contribute.3 49
C. Immigrants and Aliens
Just as the government contended that its authority over the post office
allowed it to bar from the mails material it found offensive, the govern-
ment argued that its control over immigration enabled it to bar from the
country aliens whose beliefs offended its officials. Although the Court's
mail decisions had shown concern for freedom of speech and of the press,
when the justices confronted a foreign labor-organizer who sought ad-
mission to the United States, they failed to recognize the first amendment
issues involved. Turner v. Williams 350 arose from the arrest of an English
labor-organizer by immigration officers. Based on a speech Turner gave
and a list of proposed lectures found in his pocket, an administrative
board determined that Turner was an anarchist and ordered him de-
ported under a statute barring the admission of anarchists to the United
344. The Pendleton Civil Service Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883), which established
the foundation of the modem civil service, was enacted one month after Curtis was de-
cided. Section 7, the most important part of the Act, required appointments and promo-
tions to be made on the basis of competitive examinations. Id. at 406. Sections 11
through 15 greatly expanded the prohibitions of the 1876 Act against coerced contribu-
tions to political campaigns. Id. at 406-07. Those sections barred all government em-
ployees, including members of Congress, from directly or indirectly soliciting or receiving
contributions from federal employees, and forbade superiors from firing their subordi-
nates for refusing to contribute to campaigns, upon penalty of a five thousand dollar fine
or three years in prison. Despite these statutes, coerced campaign contributions contin-
ued to be a problem. See D. Rosenbloom, supra note 328, at 84-85.
345. See Louthan v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. 196, 202 (1884).
346. See The Hatch Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 7321-27).
347. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 555 (1973); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96-98 (1947).
348. See Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564-66; Mitchell,330 U.S. at 96-98.
349. See Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 94-98.
350. 194 U.S. 279 (1904).
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States.351 Turner's attorney, Clarence Darrow, used the first amendment
as a major argument 352 but lost a near-unanimous decision 35 3 because the
Court saw the case as one of equality, not liberty.
The first part of Chief Justice Fuller's opinion said that the deportation
order and the statute authorizing it were constitutional because every
sovereign power could exclude aliens whom it believed endangered the
nation.354 Darrow did not disagree. Instead, he argued that the statute
exceeded that authority when it barred all anarchists and not just danger-
ous anarchists. Darrow presented several authoritative sources that de-
fined "anarchist" as including political philosophers who believed the
absence of government was a noble goal but who would never have used
violent means to obtain it, and he argued that such anarchists did not
endanger the nation and therefore could not be excluded.3 5
Chief Justice Fuller's response was to misread the statute, quoting it as
barring the admission of "anarchists, or persons who believe in or advo-
cate the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United
States .... When presented in that manner, the second clause seems
to explain or define the first, and Fuller concluded that when Turner said
in a speech that he was an anarchist, he thereby admitted he believed in
the violent overthrow of the nation and, therefore, was a danger to the
country.357  But the statute actually barred the admission of
"polygamists, anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the over-
throw by force or violence of the government of the United States." '358
The final clause did not define "anarchists" as violent any more than it
defined "polygamists" as violent; each of the three categories was sepa-
rate and distinct. Darrow was right: the act did allow the government to
exclude anarchists who were not a danger to it.
The Chief Justice tried to reinforce his argument by saying that even if
Turner did not seek to attain anarchy through violence, his support for a
universal strike and his discussion of the Haymarket riots created the
justifiable inference that he contemplated the use of force and that his
351. Id. at 280-83. Turner was ordered deported under the Act of March 3, 1903, ch.
1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214. 194 U.S. at 284.
352. Turner, 194 U.S. at 285-86. Darrow's co-counsel was Edgar L. Masters. Id.
353. Justice Brewer issued a short concurrence that questioned the majority's endorse-
ment of administrative deportation proceedings without judicial oversight, complained
that too little effect had been given to the tenth amendment (although without explaining
its relevance), and criticized the majority for considering Darrow's argument about
peaceful anarchists despite Turner's failure to introduce any evidence that he was a
peaceful anarchist. See id. at 295-96 (Brewer, J., concurring).
354. See Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290 (1904).
355. Id. at 292-93; cf Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir.) (government's
authority to exclude dangerous aliens may not be used to bar alien member of Commu-
nist party unless government shows a threat other than alien's party membership), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986).
356. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 293 (1904).
357. See id. at 294.
358. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214.
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speeches were incitements to that end.359 It is significant that Chief Jus-
tice Fuller felt obligated to show incitement rather than mere advocacy.
It is also important that he had to stretch so far to do it. Fuller was
unable to point to any solid evidence that Turner even had advocated-
let alone incited-any violence. Instead, he was forced to "infer" at least
partially from the prepared titles of speeches that had not been given that
Turner "contemplated" the use of force.3 Fuller's conclusions were un-
supported by the evidence, and his use of undelivered speeches clashes
with the Court's pronouncement three years later that the main purpose




But Chief Justice Fuller went one step further. In a cryptic paragraph,
he wrote that even if the statute barred some anarchists who lacked "evil
intent," Congress must have believed that their views were so dangerous
that they could be barred from the country.362 Without explanation,
Fuller said this part of the act was constitutional.36 3 He did not indicate
whether this was because Congress had had an adequate reason for bar-
ring anarchists or because he believed that Congress could determine
that any group of foreigners posed a danger to the nation. The former
reading seems more probable, if only because it is narrower.361
Chief Justice Fuller's deference also was consistent with then-prevalent
fears of anarchy and socialism. Anarchists were linked to the
Haymarket bombing of 1886, the attempted assassination of a major fin-
ancier during the Homestead steel strike, and the killing of President
McKinley in 1901, creating tremendous public hostility toward anar-
chists and socialists alike.3 65 President Roosevelt demanded the exclu-
sion of anarchists and socialists,3 66 and Congress adopted the statute
under which Turner was deported. 36' Nor did the Court remain
unaffected.368
359. See Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 294 (1904).
360. See id.
361. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
362. See Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 294 (1904).
363. See id.
364. A narrow reading also is more consistent with the Fuller Court's famous response
to legislative assertions of broad authority. See, eg., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905) (New York had no authority to interfere with freedom of contract by imposing
hour guidelines on employment); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601(1895) (Congress' authority did not extend to a "direct" tax on property); United States
v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (Congress could not act to restrain the granting of
a state monopoly).
365. See H. David, The History of the Haymarket Affair 206-18 (1936); W. Preston,
Aliens And Dissenters 21, 25-33 (1963); G. Woodcock, Anarchism, 463-65 (1962).
366. See W. Preston, supra note 365, at 31; D. Shannon, The Socialist Party Of
America 5 (1955).
367. See E. Hull, Without Justice for All 15 (1985); M. Konvitz, The Alien and the
Asiatic in American Law 35-36 (1946); W. Preston, supra note 365, at 28, 30-32.
368. For example, in 1913, Justice Holmes told a gathering of Harvard Law School
alumni that he had long thought that a "vague terror" of socialism had been "translated
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In Turner, that fear was exacerbated by widespread hostility to aliens.
Many believed that the anarchist and socialist movements in America
were led by and comprised of foreign visitors and immigrants. 369 Racial
prejudice was another factor. The immigrants of the 1890's and 1900's
came primarily from southern and eastern Europe, China, and Mex-
ico,37° provoking accusations that their inferior blood and racial charac-
teristics would weaken the country.37'
These attitudes3 72 were reflected in a series of Supreme Court decisions
that gave the government unlimited authority to exclude aliens and to
deport aliens by administrative proceedings with neither a jury trial nor
judicial intervention.373 In so holding, the Court had determined the
fifth amendment did not limit Congress because deportation could not be
considered a punishment depriving anyone of life, liberty, or property.
374
Although these decisions ostensibly were based on the government's
power to preserve itself and to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
the Court candidly had admitted that the "differences of race added
greatly to the difficulties of the situation. '3 75 Each decision concerned
the immigration of Chinese laborers to the West Coast, and the Court
did not hide its beliefs. Criticizing the Chinese for refusing to assimilate
with Californians of European stock, the Court described their immigra-
tion as "approaching the character of an Oriental invasion, .... a menace
to our civilization. 3 76 After analogizing the immigration movement to
warfare, the Court said Congress could determine that "foreigners of a
different race" were dangerous to the nation and exclude them even
into doctrines that had no proper place in the Constitution or the common law." Address
by Justice Holmes to Harvard Law School dinner (New York City, February 1913), re-
printed in 2 S. Morison, supra note 331, at 99-100.
369. See M. Konvitz, supra note 367, at 60 n. 34; W. Preston, supra note 365, at 21, 26,
30-31; P. Smith, America Enters the World 138, 141 (1985). Popular suspicions were
reinforced by the fact that some immigrants were involved in these movements. See D.
Shannon, supra note 366, at 43-48; G. Woodcock, supra note 365, at 460-62, 465.
370. See 5 Cong. Rec. 5769 (1902) (statement of Rep. Underwood); E. Hull, supra note
367, at 11-16; P. Smith, supra note 369, at 127.
371. See 35 Cong. Rec. 5769-70, 5771 (1902) (statement of Rep. Underwood); 35
Cong. Rec. 5774 (1902) (statement of Rep. Kleberg); E. Hull, supra note 367, at 15; P.
Smith, supra note 369, at 129-30, 137, 139-40.
372. See W. Preston, supra note 365, at 4, 23-26, 30-31. This perceived link between
anarchy and aliens was solidified when President McKinley's assassination was attributed
to a Polish anarchist, see Stephenson, A History Of American Immigration 151 (1926 &
photo reprint 1964), even though the killer was a native American. See W. Preston,
supra note 365, at 30-31.
373. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 97 (1903); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713
(1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609-10 (1889).
374. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713-14 (1893); see also
Nishimira Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (decision by executive or ad-
ministrative officer to deport alien is sufficient due process).
375. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889).
376. Id.
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before actual hostilities began. 3" Since the Court saw the Chinese as
invaders, it was natural for the Court to refuse to accord them the rights
of American citizens.
This concern for race and this strident opposition toward treating im-
migrants as equals of American citizens reappeared in Turner. Fuller
cited the Chinese exclusion cases and quoted Justice Shiras's language in
Wong Wing v. United States: "No limits can be put by the courts upon
the power of Congress to protect, by summary methods, the country
from the advent of aliens whose race or habits render them undesirable
as citizens.... 378
Given these racial fears and the Court's repeated refusal to treat poten-
tial immigrants as being equal in any way to American citizens, 79 it is
easy to understand the Court's view of Turner as an immigration case in
which the plaintiff happened to raise a few minor first amendment argu-
ments rather than as a first amendment case in which the plaintiff hap-
pened to be an alien. It also explains why the Court failed to understand
and summarily rejected Darrow's efforts to persuade the court that its
decision, although ostensibly limited to aliens, could affect the first
amendment rights of American citizens.
Darrow argued that if the authority to regulate commerce with foreign
nations gave Congress the power to regulate the beliefs of people passing
between this Country and other nations, then Congress' authority over
interstate commerce gave it a similar power to regulate the beliefs of
American citizens passing between states.3 "0 The Court did not even re-
spond to this argument. Darrow also argued that the first amendment
was an absolute prohibition on any government regulation of speech or
belief. Darrow pointed out that the amendment did not bar the govern-
ment from regulating citizens' beliefs while authorizing it to regulate
aliens' beliefs; the amendment simply barred any federal regulation of
speech and press, without distinguishing between citizen and alien. 38'
He further contended that this meant that while it would be correct for
the government to exclude aliens when they posed a danger to the United
States, it could not exclude aliens for their political beliefs. 8 2 Fuller ap-
parently did not understand. He wrote that Darrow's argument "seems
to be that, though Congress has the power to exclude any alien, that
power does not extend to some aliens,"38 3 an erroneous summary that
confirms the Chief Justice's lack of understanding.
Chief Justice Fuller ended his opinion with two intriguing points.
377. Id at 606.
378. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290-91 (1904) (quoting Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896)).
379. Cf Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896) (holding that separate but
equal accommodations are constitutionally permissible).
380. See Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1904) (argument of appellant).
381. See id. at 287.
382. See id. at 288-89.
383. Id at 292 (Fuller, C.J.).
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First, he warned that the Court was not "deprecating the vital impor-
tance of freedom of speech and of the press, or as suggesting limitations
on the spirit of liberty, in itself unconquerable" for the case did not in-
volve those considerations. 38" Later scholars have used this as an exam-
ple of how the Court paid mere lip service to the first amendment,
extolling its virtues in flowery language while ignoring it in practice.385
The context of the decision, however, shows that the Court did not reach
its decision because it believed the first amendment was meaningless, but
because its fears of domestic violence and its racial concerns prevented it
from understanding how the first amendment was involved. Turner was
a decision about equality: a decision that aliens did not enjoy the same
rights as did citizens. It was not a decision about what rights American
citizens enjoyed.
The final part of Chief Justice Fuller's opinion was his effort to distin-
guish the statute in Turner from the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.386
It is true that his distinctions were conclusionary, without any argumen-
tative or evidentiary support. But it also is true that this Court, which
several scholars contend took an extremely narrow interpretation of the
first amendment, still felt compelled to distinguish the problem before it
from that of the Alien and Sedition Acts, for fear that its decision might
be read as endorsing those Acts.
D. Speech in Public Places
Modern first amendment doctrine recognizes the right of individuals
to make reasonable use of public parks and streets as fora for expressing
their beliefs.387 Indeed, under some circumstances private property may
constitute a public forum for first amendment purposes.388 In this con-
text, Davis v. Massachusetts,389 in which the Supreme Court denied a
speaker the right to preach in a public park, seems a narrow interpreta-
tion of the meaning of freedom of speech. But, like many other cases,
384. Id. at 294.
385. See Rabban, supra note 7, at 523, 538. Rabban also argues that Turner seems to
apply a "bad tendency" rationale. See id. at 538. Fuller, in discussing Congress' decision
to bar even anarchists of innocent intent, did say that this must have been because Con-
gress believed that "the tendency of the general exploitation of such views is so danger-
ous", Turner, 194 U.S. at 294. However, in the preceding paragraph, he argued that
Turner's speeches were incitements towards a violent goal. Id. at 294.
386. See Turner, 194 U.S. at 294-95.
387. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969); Gregory v.
City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112 (1969); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574
(1941); Hague v. Committee For Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
388. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1968) (company town held to be public forum); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1946) (same); cf PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S.
74, 88 (1980) (free speech provision of California constitution requires owner of private
shopping mall to permit distribution of handbills whose subject is unrelated to mall). But
see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 563 (1972) (requiring connection between site of
the speech and subject of the speech).
389. 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
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Davis must be understood not in the context of the 1980's, but in the
context of the 1890's.
Davis was convicted of preaching without a permit on Sunday morn-
ing in the Boston Common, in violation of a Boston ordinance.39 The
Massachusetts Supreme Court, in an opinion by Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., upheld the conviction despite arguments that the ordinance abridged
Davis's freedom of speech.3 9 ' Holmes wrote that regulation of speech in
"a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a
member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in
his house., 3
92
The United States Supreme Court affirmed that decision. Davis had
admitted to the Court that he never had requested a permit, and the
record contained no evidence that anyone ever had been denied a per-
mit.3 93 Instead, Davis argued that if anyone could get a permit, they
served no purpose and any denial would be arbitrary.3 94 Justice White
responded that Davis wrongly assumed that he had an absolute right to
use the Common to preach, quoting Holmes's earlier language that Davis
had no more right to speak in a park than to speak in someone's private
house.395 Just as the legislature could bar the public from entering the
land and so end its dedication to public use, it could impose less drastic
restrictions on use.39 6
This language was not as harsh as it sounds. Holmes's parallel between
a city's control of its parks and a person's control of his front yard was
quite consistent with the nineteenth century's view of parks.3 97
390. See Petitioner's List of Exceptions, Record of the Appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court at 5, Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). Davis previously was convicted
of a similar offense, but failed to raise any free speech arguments. Commonwealth v.
Davis, 140 Mass. 485, 486-87, 4 N.E. 577, 578-79 (1886).
391. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (1895), af'd,
167 U.S. 43 (1897).
392. Davis, 162 Mass. at 511, 39 N.E. at 113.
393. See Petitioner's Brief to the U.S. Supreme Court at 6, 16, Davis v. Massachusses,
167 U.S. 43 (1897). The defendant in Commonwealth v. Abrahams, 156 Mass. 57, 30
N.E. 79 (1892), was convicted of giving a Fourth of July speech in Boston's Franklin
Park without a permit, but the record does not indicate, why the permit request was
denied. See 156 Mass. at 58-60, 30 N.E. at 78-80.
394. See Petitioner's Brief to the U.S. Supreme Court at 6, Davis v. Massachusetts, 167
U.S. 43 (1897).
395. See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897) (quoting Davis, 162 Mass. at
511, 39 N.E. at 113).
396. See Davis, 167 U.S. at 47.
397. The operation of a park was not yet considered to be a traditional government
function, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 544 n.9 (1985);
Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 297 (1893), since municipal corporations
owned parks in a quasi-private capacity for the exclusive benefit of the members of the
corporation. See State ex rel. Wood v. Schweickhardt, 109 Mo. 496, 512-13, 19 S.W. 47,
52 (1891) (quoting T. Cooley, The Law on Taxation 688-89 (2d ed. 1881)). Cooley had
said that when a city acted in its quasi-private capacity, the state could no more force the
city to act than it could force a private corporation to act. See 109 Mo. at 513, 19 S.W. at
52. Furthermore, the parks or commons in older cities, including Boston, had been in-
tended for providing pasture for domestic animals. Shoemaker, 147 U.S. at 297. The use
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It is tempting to say that Davis was the first case to uphold time, place,
and manner restrictions on speech,39 8 but the record is too sketchy to
support that conclusion. Justice White's opinion did say that the ordi-
nance gave the mayor the authority to grant permits in order to effectu-
ate the purpose for which the Common was maintained and to regulate
its use.399 But both Justice Holmes and Justice White expressly based
their decisions on the absence of any property right by Davis to use the
Common.4" Furthermore, neither justice discussed one of the keystones
of the modem time, place, and manner doctrine, which is that a permit
may not be denied because of the speaker's political affiliation or ideol-
ogy.4 ' In short, Davis' apparently harsh language is not relevant today,
for it was based on the then-prevalent attitudes toward government own-
ership of land, not on the first amendment.4 °2
E. Labor
Near the end of the nineteenth century, conflicts between organized
labor and business began to reach the Supreme Court. Labor unions
were a new means for workers to exchange views, obtain information,
and influence public opinion. But these aspects, all of which involved
first amendment rights, were not raised in the early labor cases, and the
violence of labor-business confrontations, combined with a now-discred-
ited concept of due process, caused the Court to adopt a decidedly pro-
of parks for human exercise and recreation was a recent development. Id. The Shoe-
maker Court observed that New York City's Central Park was the first park in the nation
deliberately provided for the inhabitants' recreational use, Shoemaker, 147 U.S. at 297,
and there were probably some who simply could not accept a further expansion of uses.
Even if they did, the original use of parks for common grazing, which had meant that no
single person had a right to control any particular part of the park, affected their view of
how parks should be used. The Davis Court pointed out that Davis failed to include any
proof as to the nature of ownership in the common which he enjoyed. See Davis v.
Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 46 (1897). One state court noted in 1892 that park commis-
sioners had the authority, within their "discretion," to say whether a person could orate
in a park, because that would require a part of the park to be set aside temporarily for the
sole use of a portion of the public. See Commonwealth v. Abrahams, 156 Mass. 57, 60,
30 N.E. 79, 79 (1892).
398. For a description of the doctrine, see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520
(1976); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1969); Amalgamated
Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 320-21 (1968);
Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405-08 (1953); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S
569, 575-76 (1941).
399. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897).
400. See id. at 46-47.
401. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1940). This may have been
because Davis failed to present any evidence of partiality.
402. The Massachusetts Supreme Court briefly said that the permit requirement did
not abridge freedom of speech, in an apparent reference to the Massachusetts constitu-
tion. Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (1895). But cf
Commonwealth v. Abrahams, 156 Mass. 57, 60, 30 N.E. 79, 79-80 (1892) (rejecting de-
fendant's argument based on the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause). The
U.S. Supreme Court's opinion did not mention freedom of speech. See Davis v. Massa-
chusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 46-48 (1897).
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business attitude. By the time the unions did present freedom of the
press claims, the Court's philosophy was set. The justices rejected the
unions' contentions in a series of opinions that ignored the Court's own
precedent regarding prior restraints and treated the speech of unions dif-
ferently than the speech of other organizations. 4°
The Supreme Court's pro-business attitude became clear in the first
major labor case, In re Debs.4  The Court held that a federal court of
equity could enjoin a strike by union members against their employer. 40 5
The Court had never before allowed a court of equity to enjoin the com-
mission of allegedly criminal acts, and, indeed, it continued to refuse re-
quests for injunctions against the publication of libels." 6 Debs enabled
an employer to obtain an ex parte temporary restraining order by claim-
ing it was necessary to preserve the status quo while his labor dispute was
resolved, even though the injunction probably would cause the strike to
collapse for lack of momentum, 4° 7 and such orders became one of the
most effective weapons in an employer's arsenal." 8 The Court further
strengthened the position of employers when it held unconstitutional a
federal statute that prohibited employers from firing or refusing to hire
union members." 9 The Court said that the statute violated the rights of
the employer and employee to freely contract, 1 0 ignoring that the deci-
sion would force employees to deal with employers from a position of
severe economic weakness. The third blow came in the Danbury Hatters
case,4 11 where the Court found that primary and secondary boycotts by a
national union in support of a local union's dispute with a manufacturer
constituted an illegal combination in restraint of trade in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.41 2 The decision drastically weakened the
strength of national unions.
The surprising aspect of the Danbury Hatters case was that the Court
endorsed an injunction that, among other things, barred the national
union from using its own circulars and the public press to spread word of
403. See L. Friedman, A History of American Law 555-61 (2d ed. 1985); A. Paul,
Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law 105-58, 219-20 (1960); L. Stein & P. Taft, The
Pullman Strike (1960).
404. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
405. See id. at 599-600.
406. See American Fed'n of Labor v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 33 App. D.C. 83,
108, 32 L.R.A (N.S.) 748, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1909).
407. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 597-98 (1895). Other federal courts went even
farther. In one case, the Court reversed a trial court that convicted several union officials
of criminal contempt for disobeying an injunction of which they had not been notified.
Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 203-04, 209-10 (1893).
408. L. Friedman, supra note 403, at 487-88; A. Paul, supra note 403, at 107-28. Con-
gress stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to issue such injunctions in the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 4, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982)).
409. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 179-80 (1908).
410. See id. at 173 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
411. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
412. Id. at 304.
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the boycott.4 13 Only one year earlier, Justice Holmes had declared in
Patterson v. Colorado that the primary purpose of the first amendment
was to prevent all prior restraints, even those aimed at preventing the
publication of false words.414 The Danbury Hatters' injunction flatly had
barred the union from publishing, but the Court did not reconcile the
injunction with Patterson.
That problem was left to Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co. "'t The
American Federation of Labor (AFL) had supported a local union's dis-
pute with a manufacturer by putting the company on the AFL's "Un-
fair" and "We Don't Patronize" list, and publishing those lists in its own
papers and the public press."' The trial court enjoined such action; the
union violated the order; and the trial court convicted several union offi-
cials of criminal contempt.417
On appeal, the defendants argued that the injunction violated Patter-
son's prohibition against prior restraints,418 and all three members of the
circuit court panel recognized the legitimacy of that concern. The two
majority judges ruled that the union's efforts had been accompanied by
threats of physical violence and coercion, and therefore that the publica-
tions were part of a conspiracy to illegally destroy the manufacturer's
trade.4" 9 Although the judges recognized that the injunction violated the
defendants' first amendment rights, they also said that the first amend-
ment could not be used to accomplish illegal ends, such as conspiracy to
injure another's business.42° In such circumstances, the defendants'
rights of expression had to be balanced against the plaintiff's property
rights.4"' As the majority pointed out, however, this meant that when
the conspiracy ended, that is, when the violence and threats of violence
ceased, the union's first amendment rights would allow it to publish the
censored lists.42 Accordingly, the majority approved only a modified,
narrowed version of the trial court's injunction.423 The single dissenter
maintained that Patterson's prohibition against prior restraints was abso-
lute, although he noted that this did not prevent the manufacturer from
seeking civil damages from the union after the list had been published."4
Ignoring those opinions, the Supreme Court went to great lengths to
413. See id. at 291-92 n.1.
414. 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
415. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
416. See id. at 421 n.1.
417. See id. at 420-25.
418. See American Fed'n of Labor v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 33 App. D.C. 83,
107-08, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 742, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1909) (argument of appellant).
419. See 33 App. D.C. at 109-10, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) at 762-63; id. at 125-26, 32 L.R.A.
(N.S.) at 769-70 (Van Orsdel, J., concurring).
420. See id. at 107-08, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) at 762.
421. See id. at 112-13, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) at 764 (Van Orsdel, J., concurring).
422. See id. at 109-10, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) at 762-63, see also id. at 126, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.)
at 769 (Van Orsdel, J., concurring).
423. See id. at 110, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) at 763.
424. See id. at 129-32, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) at 771-02 (Shepard, C.J., dissenting).
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approve the original injunction. By the time the case reached the Court,
the injunction's validity no longer was in issue; the only concern was the
legitimacy of Gompers' conviction for violating the injunction.42 5 The
Court's decision that Gompers should have been tried for civil, rather
than criminal contempt, made it unnecessary to discuss the injunction
itself.4 26 Therefore, Justice Lamar's statements for the majority that the
trial court's order had not violated any first amendment rights must be
classed as dicta. It was unpersuasive dicta. First, Justice Lamar pointed
out that the Danbury injunction had been quite similar to the injunction
in Gompers ;427 he failed to mention that the former case had not consid-
ered the first amendment aspects of the injunction. Second, Lamar wrote
that conspiracy to destroy a business may exist whenever outsiders inter-
vened in a dispute between a manufacturer and a local union, and the
presence of a conspiracy made all acts in furtherance of the conspiracy,
such as publishing information, illegal.4 28 The circuit court had said that
a conspiracy existed only when threats of violence were present;429 but
Lamar noted that different courts had different requirements for conspir-
acy.430 That was unimportant he said, because "whatever the require-
ment of the particular jurisdiction," when a conspiracy was present the
injunction could issue.4 31 Since the federal courts then enjoyed the
power to create common law even in areas traditionally reserved to the
states,4 32 it is unclear why Justice Lamar did not establish a single rule.
His loose language, however, indicated that a state could define any
group, especially a union, to be a conspiracy.
If Justice Lamar had stopped at that point, it could be argued that
Gompers merely said that acts to further a conspiracy were illegal. But
Justice Lamar went further. After recognizing that workers had the
right "to unite and to invite others to join their ranks," he wrote that this
union of workers gave them an unfair advantage over individual busi-
nesses, transforming their speech into "verbal acts" which enjoyed less
first amendment protections than did the speech of individuals or busi-
nesses.433 Justice Lamar's reference to the rights of an individual implied
that a single person might be entitled to publish a "Don't Patronize" list.
But if the publication of such a list showed an intent to destroy another's
business (which was illegal), then how could a single person possibly en-
425. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 451 (1911); Buck's Stove
& Range Co. v. American Fed'n of Labor, 219 U.S. 581 (1911) (per curiam) (dismissing
for mootness original challenge to the injunction).
426. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 449, 452 (1911).
427. See id. at 438-39.
428. See id. at 437-38.
429. See American Fed'n of Labor v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 33 App. D.C. 83,
109-10, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 748, 762-63 (1909); id. at 125-26, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) at 765 (Van
Orsdel, J., concurring).
430. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 437 (1911).
431. Id.
432. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
433. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911).
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joy such a right to publish? Apparently Justice Lamar believed that an
individual had greater first amendment rights than did an organization.
More precisely, Justice Lamar believed the individual's first amendment
rights exceeded those of unions.4 34 Even though the AFL's members had
assembled to form a union, a single entity, Justice Lamar saw the mem-
bership as individuals acting by temporary agreement. Since the workers
still were individuals, they could comprise a conspiracy. Justice Lamar
made no suggestion, however, that when individual property owners or
stockholders joined together to form a company, their decisions not to
buy from certain workers should be considered decisions of a group as a
conspiracy. What Lamar saw was a single entity, the corporation, and a
corporation's subparts cannot conspire with each other. In short, work-
ers had developed a new tool for communicating among themselves, a
tool which paralleled in some ways the new corporation of the late eight-
eenth century, but Justice Lamar refused to allow it to function.
The next decision, Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell,435 made the
Court's desire to destroy the union as a means of communication be-
tween workers abundantly clear. The defendants were union representa-
tives who tried to persuade workers at a company mine to join the union,
although the workers had signed yellow dog contracts that barred them
from joining any union.436 The majority opinion admitted that there had
been no picketing or threats of physical violence,437 but nevertheless
ruled that the defendants' attempted persuasion was an illegal conspiracy
in restraint of trade that interfered with the rights of the company to
enjoy the benefits of its contracts. 438 The Court recognized that Gompers
had declared that workers had the right to join unions and to invite other
workers to join, but said this right could only be used for lawful pur-
poses, which did not include inducing workers to violate their yellow dog
contracts. 439 Despite a strong dissent by Justice Brandeis, 440 the Court
endorsed the trial court's injunction that prohibited the union from tell-
ing people that the mine's failure to unionize would injure them. 44I
The effect of Hitchman was strikingly clear: if an employer required
his workers to sign contracts in which they agreed not to join a union,
union representatives could not talk to them, nor presumably could the
workers talk to each other about joining a union. But Hitchman merely
was the culmination of a long series of labor cases in which the Court
434. But cf Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533
(1980) (corporation's speech protected by first amendment); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 777, 784 (1978) (first amendment protections not abrogated merely because
speaker is corporation).
435. 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
436. See id. at 239-46.
437. See id. at 262.
438. See id. at 259-60.
439. See id. at 258-59.
440. Id. at 263-74. Justices Holmes and Clarke joined the dissent.
441. See id. at 261-62.
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persuaded itself that the goal of inhibiting the development of unions as
major political and economic forces justified severely restricting the abil-
ity of workers to use the new communication tool that they created.
F. New Methods Of Communication-Motion Pictures
The birth of the motion picture at the turn of the century created a
new first amendment problem. Should guarantees of freedom of expres-
sion developed in an era where ideas were presented by street-corner ora-
tors, pamphleteers, town-meeting speakers, and small-town newspaper
editors also apply to a means of communication that was unlike anything
the world had ever seen? The problem was not limited to the motion
picture, and the Court's decision to tolerate government regulation of
movies despite the first amendment presaged later decisions to allow the
government to oversee the other broadcast media.
In Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio,"' the Court
addressed the government's authority to regulate the new form of com-
munication. The decision upheld an Ohio statute that forbade the display
of films until they had been approved by a state censorship board, despite
arguments that this violated the first amendment and the Ohio constitu-
tion." 3 The Court based its decision on the state constitution's free
speech provision,' 4 and discussed neither the first amendment nor its
applicability to the states. This decision to construe the Ohio constitu-
tion was puzzling because earlier decisions had said that the Court
lacked jurisdiction to declare a state law void because of a conflict with a
state constitution." 5 The Court also would not consider whether the
state law violated the first amendment to the Constitution, because the
Court repeatedly had said that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the
states." 6 The Court, of course, could have discussed whether the state
law violated another part of the Constitution, but no such issue was
raised. Furthermore, the Court's construction of the Ohio constitution's
free speech provision could be applied to the first amendment because of
the similarity of the two provisions' language and the Court's failure to
base its decision on factors unique to the Ohio constitution." Unfortu-
nately, the Court did not explain why it had authority to interpret Ohio's
442. 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
443. See id. at 231-36, 237-38 (argument of petitioner).
444. See id. at 241.
445. See Leeper v. Texas, 139 U.S. 462, 467 (1891); Congdon v. Goodman, 67 U.S. (2
Black) 574, 575 (1862); Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 88-89 (1857); Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 392 (1798). Since the adoption of the doctrine of incorpora-
tion, the Court has said that a state constitution may give greater protection to individual
liberties than does the Bill of Rights, and that it will interpret a state constitution only to
determine if it violates a federal constitutional right. See PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
446. See cases collected supra note 143.
447. Ohio Const. art. 1, § 11 (providing -[e]very citizen may freely speak, write and
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the right; and no
law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press.").
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constitution, why it did so unnecessarily, or why its ruling should not
also apply to the first amendment.
Justice McKenna's majority opinion revealed a view of the first
amendment deeply hostile to freedom of speech. In Patterson, the Court
had said that the main-if not the only-purpose of the first amendment
was to prevent prior restraints on the press,"' and the Ohio censorship
system clearly was a form of prior restraint. Justice McKenna, while
recognizing the special power of the motion picture to educate and per-
suade," 9 distinguished Patterson by saying that motion pictures were not
"within the principle" of "freedom of opinion and its expression.., by
speech, writing or printing."4 ' Though the petitioner contended that
moving pictures and drama were forms of both speech and the press, and
pointed out that the Court said movies could violate a copyright,4 'I Jus-
tice McKenna wrote that the "first impulse of the mind is to reject the
contention. We immediately feel that the argument is wrong.... 452
The reason, he argued, was that "the exhibition of moving pictures is a
business pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other
spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio
constitution, we think, as part of the press of the country or as organs of
public opinion." '453 This, of course, did not explain why freedom of the
press protected profit-motivated spectacles that were printed on paper.
His main objection seemed to be that moving pictures had a special
power for evil because of their attractiveness and manner of exhibition.454
In other words, Justice McKenna believed that a medium of expression
could be too effective to be protected by a constitutional provision in-
tended to protect methods of expression.
Mutual Film had far-reaching consequences, the least of which was
that it served as precedent for upholding other state censorship
schemes.455 With the application of the first amendment to the states in
1925, Patterson's absolute prohibition against prior restraint456 should
have invalidated all state censorship systems. However, it was not until
1952 that the Court declared that motion pictures were protected by the
first amendment and that censorship systems infringed upon freedom of
448. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
449. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 242, 244 (1915).
450. Id. at 243.
451. See Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 60 (1911).
452. Mutual Film Corp. v Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S 230, 243 (1915).
453. Id. at 244.
454. See id.
455. See Mutual Film Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 247 (1915) (upholding state
censorship of films on the authority of Mutual Film Corp.); Mutual Film Corp. v.
Hodges, 236 U.S. 248 (1915) (same).
456. "[T]he main purpose of such constitutional provisions is 'to prevent all such previ-
ous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other governments' . ... The
preliminary freedom extends as well to the false as to the true .. " Patterson v. Colo-
rado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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expression.4 57
More important, Mutual Film reaffirmed the Court's inability to har-
monize the first amendment with new technology. Early Court decisions
had protected and encouraged new methods of communication: Ex parte
Jackson protected the distribution of ideas by the new mail system, 58
and other cases encouraged the effective use of the first amendment by
impliedly upholding special low rates for newspapers and periodicals."5 9
But in Rapier,'6 the compromise upon which Jackson was based was
destroyed by further developments in technology, developments that the
Court ignored. In Mutual Film, the Court implied a new attitude to-
wards the constitutional protections, when it, and the petitioner, as-
sumed that the question was whether these protections should be
extended to moving pictures.4 6 ' Furthermore, in other areas the Court
had been more than willing to expand the scope of constitutional protec-
tions to include new technology. In Debs, the Court was willing to ex-
pand constitutional provisions to apply to new social organizations in
order to prevent expression of opinion by a labor union.462 In Mutual
457. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (expressly overrul-
ing Mutual Film).
458. 96 U.S. 727 (1877), discussed supra at notes 206-25 and accompanying text.
459. See Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 107-08 (1904); Houghton v. Payne,
194 U.S. 88, 94 (1904).
460. In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892).
461. The Court wrote that "the argument is wrong or strained which extends the guar-
anties of free opinion and speech... and which seeks to bring motion pictures and other
spectacles into practical and legal similitude to a free press and liberty of opinion." Mu-
tual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 243-44 (1915) (emphasis added).
The petitioner argued that the constitutional guaranties were not limited to forms of
publication known at the time the Constitution was adopted. Id. at 238. Neither the
petitioner nor the Court cited Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897), where the
Court had said that the Bill of Rights protected only "certain guaranties and immunities
which we had inherited from our English ancestors."
462. 158 U.S. 564 (1895). When Eugene Debs, accused of leading a strike which inter-
fered with interstate commerce by blocking railroads, argued that the commerce clause
did not give Congress control over forms of transportation that did not exist when the
Constitution was adopted, the Court flatly declared:
Constitutional provisions do not change, but their operation extends to new
matters as the modes of business and the habits of life of the people vary with
each succeeding generation.... The power is the same. But it operates to-day
upon modes of interstate commerce unknown to the fathers, and it will operate
with equal force upon any new modes of such commerce which the future may
develop.
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 591 (1895); see also Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 385 (1898)
(law is "a progressive science"); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530-31 (1884)
(spirit of personal liberty developed by progressive growth and wise adaption to circum-
stances). But cf Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) (Bill of Rights was "not
intended to lay down any novel principles of government, but simply to embody certain
guaranties and immunities which we had inherited from our English ancestors, and
which had from time immemorial been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions aris-
ing from the necessities of the case").
Robertson does not rebut the contention that the Constitution's provisions should be
expanded to reflect new technology. Justice Brown said that the exceptions to free speech
and free press that were part of the first amendment included prohibitions against libels,
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Film, it refused to expand the scope of the freedom of speech and the
press to apply to new technology where that would encourage expression
of opinion.
The Court's attitude in Mutual Film toward new technology was re-
flected in later events. In 1919, the Postmaster General prevented the
New York World from using the previously unregulated telegraph to dis-
tribute an article that criticized him;463 two years later, the Court upheld
his decision to deny special mail rates to a newspaper because of its edito-
rial content.4" Censorship systems of motion pictures were upheld until
1952.465 It later said that state censorship systems with certain proce-
dural safeguards may be constitutional.466 In 1943, the Court upheld fed-
eral regulation of radio stations, 467 although Justice Frankfurter based
the decision on the limited number of radio frequencies and warned that
regulations could not consider a station's editorial views. 468 Although
blasphemous or indecent articles, and publications injurious to public morals or private
reputation. A reading that argues this supports a narrow interpretation of the first
amendment, see Rabban, supra note 6, at 539-40, suffers from a basic flaw. Justice Brown
described those exceptions in general terms, such as "libel" and matter "injurious to pub-
lic morals." Robertson, 165 U.S. at 282. If he meant that the first amendment recognized
these general categories as exceptions, but that courts were free to develop new definitions
of these terms, thereby restricting the scope of hisexceptions, then his argument is consis-
tent with Debs, Hurtado, and Holden. If he meant that the first amendment recognized
as exceptions those categories as they were defined by the courts of the United Kingdom
when the Constitution was adopted, then his argument has several problems. First, he
does not explain what those definitions were. Second, he does not explain why the draft-
ers, having just declared independence from England because of the invasion of their
personal rights intended to incorporate English definitions of those rights. Third, since
seditious libel was recognized in England until at least 1909, Authority and Precedent in
Libel Cases, 44 The Law Journal 42 (Jan. 23, 1909) he does not explain the decline of
seditious libel in the United States during the nineteenth century.
In any case, Robertson does not support Mutual Film's holding that motion pictures
are not entitled to constitutional protection. Robertson said that certain types of state-
ments are not protected. Robertson would allow a libel action against a motion picture
producer for defamatory statements contained in a film yet it said nothing to indicate that
even non-defamatory statements in a film are not protected. Indeed, if the Robertson
court had believed that the framers did not intend to protect new forms of expression, it
could have added those new forms to its list of exceptions.
463. See Z. Chafee, supra note 10, at 99 n.105 (citing Collier's Weekly, May 17, 1919,
p.16).
464. See United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v.
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921).
465. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 499-506 (1952).
466. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 682 (1968);
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365
U.S. 43 (1961).
467. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
468. See id. at 226-27. Later courts, however, have said that the federal government
may require broadcast stations to give equal time to political candidates and to those who
disagree with the station's positions, but that state governments may not impose similar
requirements on newspapers. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communi-
cations Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (fairness doctrine constitutional as applied to
broadcasters) with Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (state
governments may not impose equal time requirements on newspapers).
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these cases do not cite Mutual Film, its legacy is reflected in the Court's
willingness to permit, by comparison to traditional press cases, far more
regulation of media that did not exist at the time of the Constitution.
IV. THE FRAMERS' INTENT
In the past decade, the original intent of the Constitution's framers has
assumed new importance as a means for interpreting the document.46 9
Many advocates of this interpretational tool have used it to limit the pro-
tections and scope of the fourteenth amendment47 and the Bill of
Rights.47 The first amendment's free speech and press clauses are not
immune to such attacks. Professor Leonard Levy and Justice Hugo
Black worried that Legacy of Suppression's analysis of the original intent
of those clauses would be used to narrow their meanings," 2 and any dis-
cussion of the Supreme Court's earlier decisions about freedom of expres-
sion should provoke similar concern. On first glance, cases like
Patterson, Davis, and Mutual Film appear to give ample ammunition to
those who would narrow modern first amendment doctrine. 4 "17 But such
use of the Court's early opinions is improper, and not just because of the
inconsistencies and irrationalities revealed by this Article. Advocates of
the original intent theory must consider these cases flawed because the
early cases themselves make little use of the framer's intent. The justices,
and the attorneys who appeared before them, rarely supported their ar-
guments with any references to the framer's intended meaning of the first
amendment. Furthermore, the justices seldom supported their statements
with any historical evidence, so that their discussions reveal more about
469. See, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 11; Powell, supra note 11; 1 The Founders' Con-
stitution, supra note 2, at xi-xiii.
470. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777-78 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing); Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1123-29 (S.D. Ala.), aff'din
part, rev'd in part, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), rey'd sub nom. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38 (1985); Rehnquist, supra note 13, at 699-700, 703-04.
471. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(use of framers' intent to limit scope of establishment clause); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 787-93 (1983) (same); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 607-11 (1980)
(White, J., dissenting) (use of framers' intent to limit fourth amendment); Rehnquist,
supra note 11, at 695 (criticism of view of eighth amendment that ignores framers*
intent).
472. Levy warned against reliance on framers' intent to construe the first amendment,
see Levy I, supra note 2, at 5, 309, and concluded the book by suggesting that because the
framers "were Blackstonians does not mean that we cannot be Brandeisians," id. at 309, a
reference to the narrow views he ascribed to the framers and the broader interpretation of
the first amendment advanced by Justice Brandeis. In his later book, Emergence Of A
Free Press, Levy recounts how Legacy appalled some liberals, including Justice Black,
who labeled it "probably one of the most devastating blows that has been delivered
against civil liberty in America for a long time." Levy II, supra note 2, at xvii-xviii. Levy
notes, however. that Black's fears that conservatives would use the book to attack first
amendment doctrine have not materialized. Id. at xviii.
473. See Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Printing, 89 N.J. 451, 470, 446 A.2d 469,
478 (1982) (Schreiber, J., dissenting) (citing Rabban, supra note 7, to support a narrou
view of the first amendment in libel case).
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the Court's attitude toward the use of the framers' intent than about the
actual substance of that intent. Indeed, in a crucial decision that author-
ized government regulation of the motion picture industry, the Court
plainly contravened the original intent of the framers.474
Attorneys who invoked the intentions of the founders regarding free-
dom of speech and of the press did so in an attempt to maintain or
strengthen first amendment liberties, and invariably they were unsuccess-
ful. One attorney argued that a federal statute that barred lottery adver-
tisements from the mails was unconstitutional because the framers
intended to bar primarily prior restraints and to allow post-publication
restraints only in cases of libel.475 The attorney's three-page discussion,
which made extensive use of Alexander Hamilton's brief in the famous
libel case of People v. Croswell,47 6 was more extensive than the Court's
discussion of the framers' intent in any other decision, but the Court
ruled against the attorney's client without discussing the intent argu-
ment.477 In a later case, Clarence Darrow cited a considerable amount of
historical material to show the framers had not intended to allow the
government to exclude aliens with unpopular political beliefs; 4 78 the
Court also ignored his contentions.4 79 A publisher's attorney in Lewis
Publishing Co. v. Morgan 480 argued that since the framers had intended
to prevent censorship by prior restraint or by the retrospective tactics of
obstruction and punishment, the government could not limit the use of
cheap mail rates to publishers who satisfied certain government require-
ments.48' One of the requirements to use the mail was that a publisher
divulge the names and addresses of its editor, publisher, business man-
ager, owners, stockholders, and creditors.48z The publisher's attorney
pointed out that the Constitution itself had been adopted in part because
474. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915), discussed
supra at text accompanying notes 442-61.
475. See In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 120-21 (1892) (argument of petitioner). Counsel
also argued that in free press litigation, the framers had wanted the jury to decide all
matters of fact and law. Counsel conceded, even at this late date, that a criminal libel
defendant had to show not only that his statements were true, but also that they were
published with good motives and for justifiable ends. Id. at 121. An attorney who repre-
sented a publisher in a later case also said that the first amendment prohibited restrictions
on the press, "excepting only in matters of recognized morality and subject always to
responsibility at common law for libelous statements." Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan,
229 U.S. 288, 292 (1913) (argument for appellant). Both statements support Professor
Levy's contention that the first amendment did not change the law of libel-including
seditious libel-in the United States. Levy II, supra note 2, at 220-28.
476. 3 Johns. Cas. 336 (N.Y. 1804); see also Forkosch, Freedom of the Press: Croswell's
Case, 33 Fordham L. Rev. 415 (1965) (detailed discussion of the argument in the case).
477. In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 134-35 (1892).
478. See Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1904) (argument for appellants)
(citing Madison's notes on the constitutional convention, The Federalist, No. 46, the
Kentucky Resolutions, J. Madison, Virginia Resolutions, and Elliott's Debates.
479. See supra text accompanying notes 354-83.
480. 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
481. See id. at 292 (argument for appellant).
482. See Post Office Appropriation Act, ch. 389, § 2, 37 Stat. 539, 553-54 (1912).
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of anonymous publications.483 His arguments were ignored.
The Court also ignored efforts to invoke the framers' intent in Mututal
Film. Movie industry attorneys contended that the framers did not in-
tend to limit first amendment protections to those types of publications
that existed in 1791.484 Their argument had strong evidence to support
it.
Many of the framers opposed the first amendment because they be-
lieved the Constitution did not give the federal government the power to
regulate opinion, speech, or the press. To their minds, the first amend-
ment was unnecessary. 485 Alexander Hamilton asked, "why declare that
things shall not be done, which there is no power to do?"'4 8 6 Their con-
cern was that the first amendment would be read, not as an affirmation
that the government lacked certain powers, but rather as a declaration of
the sole limitations on government power concerning expression.4 87 Ar-
guably, under that theory, the burden was on the government to show
that the Constitution granted it the power to control the telegraph and
the motion picture. The Mutual Film Court, however, said that its "first
impulse" was to reject that argument.488 Instead, Mutual Film seemed
to give the user of the new technology the burden of showing that the
Constitution's protections should be expanded to include the new
technology.
When the Court did use the framers' intent regarding the first amend-
ment's speech and press clauses, it was to justify a narrow interpretation
of those provisions. Several decisions cited very early state court cases or
statutes passed by the First Congress,489 presumably equating such mate-
483. See Lewis Publishing, 229 U.S. at 292-93 (argument for appellant).
484. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 238 (1915) (argu-
ment for appellants).
485. Levy II, supra note 2, at 221, 224-26, 269-70.
486. The Federalist No. 84, at 574 (A. Hamilton) (P. Ford ed. 1898); 1. Wilson, State
House Speech (Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in 1 The Founders' Constitution, supra note 2, at
449.
487. See J. Wilson, Address to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 28 and
Dec. 4, 1787), reprinted in I The Founders' Constitution, supra note 2, at 453, 454 ("A
bill of rights annexed to a constitution is an enumeration of the powers reserved. If we
attempt an enumeration, every thing that is not enumerated is presumed to be given.");
see also The Federalist No. 84, at 573-74 (A. Hamilton) (P. Ford ed. 1898) (Bill of Rights
would "contain various exceptions to powers [which are] not granted; and on this very
account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted.").
488. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 243 (1915).
489. See Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 506 (1904) (status of postal
service at time of Constitution and first Congress); Rosen v. United States, Ibl U.S. 29,
36 (1896) (citing Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91 (Pa. 1815) and Com-
monwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821) to show the required elements of indictment
for obscenity); Ex pare Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 372 (1882) (citing federal statutes of 1789
and 1791 concerning conflict of interest rules for federal workers); Ex parte Jackson, 9b
U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (citing 1836 Postal Act). As noted earlier, the Court on one in-
stance felt compelled to distinguish the statute that formed the basis of its decision from
the Sedition Act of 1802. See Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 294-95 (1904), and supra
text accompanying note 386.
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rial with the framers' intent. Not a single decision cited to the debates in
the House of Representatives about the amendment. Indeed, the Court
usually referred to the framers' intent in a single paragraph or sentence
without providing any documentary support.49 ° Nor did the Court value
consistency in its use of the framers' intent. When the Court wanted to
justify post-publication restraints on the press, it said the original pur-
pose of the first amendment was to prevent prior restraints; when the
Court wanted to endorse a prior restraint of the press, the original pur-
pose was ignored.49 1 When the Court wanted the government to regulate
railroads, a form of interstate commerce that did not exist when the Con-
stitution was adopted, it argued that the operation of constitutional pro-
visions extended to new matters as business practices and the habits of
people changed,492 but when motion picture makers tried to use the same
principle to extend first amendment protections to their new form of pub-
lication, the Court summarily rejected the argument.493
At best, one could say that the Court's use of the original intent of the
Constitution was quite selective. Since many of the first amendment
cases that appeared before the Court were cases of first impression, it is
surprising that the Court's use of the amendment's original intent was so
infrequent and so sketchy in nature. The reasons for this are difficult to
ascertain. The Court made extensive use of history and the framers' in-
tent regarding the religion clauses,494 and the fourth and fifth amend-
ments. 49 5 It may have been that the Court recognized the legislative
history behind the free speech and press clauses was too sparse to be of
value; it also may have been that the Court believed that history would
not support its generally narrow interpretations of those clauses.
One of the Court's references to original intent, however, does deserve
special notice. In Robertson v. Baldwin,4 96 the Court held that the thir-
teenth amendment's ban on involuntary servitude contained an unwrit-
ten exception that prevented seamen from breaching labor contracts. To
justify that ruling, the Court said that the Bill of Rights simply embodied
490. See, e.g., Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 243 (1915);
Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454,
462 (1907); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897).
491. Compare Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (purpose of first amend-
ment is to prevent all previous restraints) with Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221
U.S. 418, 438 (1911) (approving injunction against publication of boycott list) and Mu-
tual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 241-46 (1915) (approving censor-
ship system for motion pictures).
492. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 591 (1895) ("Constitutional provisions do not change,
but their operation extends to new matters as the modes of business and habits of life of
the people vary with each succeeding generation.").
493. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 243-44 (1915) ("we
immediately feel that the argument is wrong or strained which extends the guarantees of
free opinion and speech to the multitudinous shows which are advertised on the bill-
boards of our cities").
494. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162-65 (1878).
495. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622-31 (1886).
496. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
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guarantees and immunities inherited from England and contained certain
well-recognized, unwritten exceptions. One exception was that the first
amendment "does not permit the publication of libels, blasphemous or
indecent articles, or other publications injurious to public morals or pri-
vate reputation."497 This language was dicta unsupported by citation,
but it appears consistent with Levy's position about the effect of the first
amendment on the law of libel and seditious libel.498 On the other hand,
a few years later Justice Holmes argued that constitutional provisions
were organic living institutions transplanted from English soil, whose
meaning must consider their origin and the line of their growth.499 Curi-
ously, Holmes cited the above passage from Robertson for support.'
In short, the Court's decisions provide very little evidence as to what
the framers intended regarding the rights of expression. The Court's in-
frequent and selective use of original intent and its failure to provide any
in-depth analysis to support its contentions about such intent suggest
that the Court did not see original intent as the basis for all constitutional
interpretation, but merely as an interpretative tool that could be used
when it suited the Court's purpose.
CONCLUSION
Although the freedom of expression doctrines which the Supreme
Court developed between 1791 and 1917 were not as broad or as liberta-
rian as modem doctrines, it would be an exaggeration to say that the
Court was thoroughly hostile to freedom of speech and of the press. It
would be an even greater error to suggest that the Court's decisions dur-
ing this time should be considered when confronting first amendment
issues today.
The Court's record on speech and the press was, for the most part,
mixed. It warned against and finally abolished Congress' use of a legisla-
tive contempt power to silence those who criticized that body;50' it recog-
nized claims of privilege and probable cause as defenses in libel
actions;50 2 it protected criticism of courts for decisions in completed
cases, 50 3 and it blocked President Roosevelt's use of seditious libel. ' In
the important area of the use of the postal system, it initially prohibited
censorship of the mail,505 it recognized the importance of protecting un-
popular opinions,50 6 and it endorsed huge subsidies which encouraged
497. Id at 281.
498. See Levy I, supra note 2, at 247-48.
499. See Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610-12 (1914).
500. Id at 610.
501. See supra text accompanying notes 68-98.
502. See supra text accompanying notes 109-32.
503. See supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
504. See supra text accompanying notes 170-94.
505. See supra text accompanying notes 217-25.
506. See supra text accompanying notes 235-48.
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the dissemination of information." 7 Such decisions were important and
deserve to be noted.
A number of decisions presented, however, a narrow view of the first
amendment's scope. These decisions should not be overlooked, but
many should be given little weight. The two most negative opinions-
Patterson v. Colorado and Turner v. Williams-were badly written prod-
ucts of the Court's concern for matters unrelated to the first amendment.
Similarly, the Court's efforts to block the use of parks, labor unions, and
motion pictures as new methods of communication did not reflect the
Court's attitude toward freedom of speech and the press, but rather re-
veal the Court's hostility to change, to new technology, and, in the labor
cases, the Court's personal and class biases.
These criticisms point up a striking coincidence which profoundly af-
fects the modem value of these early Supreme Court decisions. The
number of first amendment cases that appeared before the Court began
to increase dramatically after 1890, even as the Court began to sink into
perhaps the lowest and most embarrassing period of its history, a period
marked by abysmal writing laced with doctrinal rigidity, 08 racial bias, 09
and a strong prejudice in favor of certain economic and social inter-
ests, 510 characteristics which mirrored the attitudes of the Victorian era.
This was the Court that said segregation was permissible,51' that control
of ninety-eight percent of the sugar manufacturing capacity in the nation
was not a monopoly in violation of interstate trade,512 that maximum
hour laws intended to protect workers from exploitation were violations
of the workers' freedom of contract, 51 3 and that the national income tax
was unconstitutional. 14 Modem scholars and judges would not think of
using Plessy v. Ferguson 515 as the basis for equal protection law or United
States v. E. C. Knight516 as the foundation of antitrust doctrine; and
there is no more reason to use the freedom of expression cases of that
same period as the basis for modem first amendment law.
It might have been better if Justice Holmes, Chafee, and their early
successors had written on the subject of this Article and had explained
why they were ignoring over a century of precedent. But their silence on
this matter should not be read as a decision bom of fear that such prece-
dent would destroy their ideas or as a plot to hide information from the
507. See supra text accompanying notes 277-78.
508. See G. Gilmore, The Ages Of American Law 62-64 (1977).
509. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 369-74.
510. See supra text accompanying notes 403-41.
511. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
512. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
513. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
514. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895); see also 2 C. War-
ren, supra note 7, at 699-700, 700 nn.1-2 (discussion of decision and public opposition to
it).
515. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
516. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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public. It was instead a recognition that existing case law was illegiti-
mate because of factors which, as has been shown, were too complex and
lengthy to be the stuff of which persuasive public arguments were made.
Their decision to proceed as if the Court had remained quiet on first
amendment issues for one hundred and twenty years was valid; first
amendment doctrine as it exists today has little to fear from a reasoned
analysis of the cases they relegated to the silent and empty night.

